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Chapter 6
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
People’s Republic of China
Area: 9.6 million km2
Population: 1,299.88 million (as of end of 2005)
Capital: Beijing
Language: Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian, Uighur
Religion: Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity
Government type: Socialist republic
Chief of state: President Hu Jintao
Currency: yuan (US$1 = 8.0702 yuan; as of end of 2005, based
on median rate of the People’s Bank of China)
Fiscal year: Calendar year
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The successful launch of Shenzhou-6, China’s second manned space-craft, in the autumn of 2005 created a strong impression both at
home and abroad that China has been developing very successfully.
Following Jiang Zemin’s complete resignation from key posts, the admin-
istration of President Hu Jintao launched a full-fledged effort to
strengthen and expand the political foundation of his government. As part
of this effort, Hu adopted a series of slogans, to focus on the promotion of
a “scientific concept of development” and the building of “a harmonious
society.” His administration also pushed an “education campaign to pre-
serve the advanced nature of party members,” in a bid to enhance the
policy-execution capability of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) senior
officials, and to impose tougher discipline on them. But there a large
number of deep-rooted contradictions remain in Chinese society, leaving
the Hu administration with a pile of problems to tackle.
In the area of bilateral relations, China’s ties with Japan have worsened
notably, and it seems unlikely that the two countries will soon reach any
breakthrough to improve the situation. China has tried to strengthen its
diplomatic ties with the United States, through a series of summit talks
with the US leader and a strategic dialogue, but relations between the two
countries could go either way—towards greater confrontation or greater
cooperation. While trying to reinforce its ties with the United States,
Beijing has also stepped up its approaches to Russia and European coun-
tries. On the multilateral front, China has been pushing for multilateral
diplomacy, by actively participating in regional international frameworks
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and East Asia
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Summit, as well as the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program,
although the major powers that take part in such regional frameworks
each try to assert their leadership.
China’s economy has maintained a high growth rate of 9.9 percent.
But fixed capital investment, a prime mover of China’s economic expan-
sion in recent years, is beginning to generate a huge supply capacity that
exceeds demand expansion. Despite the fact that the monetary authority
has let the renminbi appreciate slightly against the US dollar, as import
growth has slackened due to credit tightening, the country’s trade surplus
swelled to record-breaking levels, surpassing that of Japan and intensify-
ing trade frictions with the United States and Europe. In its economic
management policy, China has been facing the difficult task of simultane-
ously sustaining stable growth and reducing external imbalances.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
In an attempt to strengthen and expand his political power base after tak-
ing control of the party (general secretary), the state (president), and the
military (chairman of the Communist Party of China Central Military
Commission), Hu Jintao has begun to impose himself more in policy
making. Hu has put particular emphasis on improving the policy-execu-
tion capability of senior party officials, by promoting education tailored to
each rank of party members, and implementing an “education campaign
to preserve their advanced nature” as part of efforts toward greater cen-
tralization of power within the party. But many problems inherent to the
Chinese society remain, including corruption and bribery of senior party
members, and a wide disparity between rich and poor. The frequency of
riots initiated by citizens in recent years is symbolic of the seriousness of
these problems.
National People’s Congress and Government Policy in 2005
The third conference of the 10th National People’s Congress was held
from March 5 to March 14, 2005. In reporting on government activities to
the conference, Premier Wen Jiabao said that, with reference to the Deng
Xiaoping Theory and the important idea of the “Three Represents” as a
guide to action, the Chinese government would respect the spirit of the 16
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Third
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC, and the
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Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC. Wen
also said China would seriously address all issues related to economic and
social development in line with the “scientific concept of development,”
strengthen and improve macroeconomic control, promote various activi-
ties based on the reform and opening up policy, build a socialist-led “har-
monious society,” and push for socialism that can simultaneously advance
material civilization, political civilization, and spiritual civilization. The
premier also emphasized the following policies in connection with activi-
ties being promoted for 2005: (1) setting a GDP growth rate target of
about 8 percent, balancing international balance of payments, cutting the
issuance of long-term construction bonds by 30 billion yuan from the pre-
ceding year, to 80 billion yuan, creating 9 million new jobs in urban areas,
and keeping the unemployment rate below 4.6 percent; (2) maintaining
the renminbi’s exchange rates at stable levels; (3) giving highest priority
to the so-called “three agricultural factors” (agriculture, farm villages, and
farmers), and totally repealing agricultural taxes within 2006; (4) promot-
ing major development projects in western China, and promoting devel-
opment of central China and former industrial areas such as northeastern
China; (5) stepping up reforms of state-owned companies and encourag-
ing nonpublic economic development; (6) trying to build a “harmonious
society” in order to realize the “scientific concept of development”; and
(7) endeavoring to establish a democratic legal system.
China’s defense budget in 2005 surged 15.6 percent from the initial
budget for 2004, making 17 years straight of double-digit growth.
Commenting on this budget, the Chinese government emphasized that
the nation’s defense spending has continued to account for a very small
portion of overall fiscal expenditures and gross domestic product (GDP).
The government also stressed that part of the increase in defense spending
for 2005 was to finance a moderate improvement in the treatment of mili-
tary personnel, social security for soldiers, and the formation of troop
units, and adjustment and revision of their mechanisms.
On March 14, mainland China formally adopted the Anti-Secession
Law. The law states its aim to be stopping the Taiwanese independence
movement from splitting the country. The law sets three conditions for
resorting to non-peaceful action, or the use of force. The three conditions
are: (1) if “Taiwan independence” forces, under whatever name and
method, accomplish the fact of Taiwan’s separation from the Mainland; or
(2) if a major event occurs that could lead to Taiwan’s separation from the
mainland; or (3) if all possibility of peaceful unification is lost. The law
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empowered the State Council and the CPC Central Military Commission
to decide whether to use force against Taiwan (refer to Foreign Relations).
Major Personnel Reshuffle in 2005
Hu Jintao controlled all of the party, the state, and the military, both in
name and reality, when he was elected the chairman of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) Central Military Commission at the National
People’s Congress in March 2005. In 2005, the administration led by Hu
carried out a major personnel reshuffle, indicating he was gradually build-
ing up his power base. In the reshuffle of the State Council, four new min-
isters were appointed—Gao Qiang as minister of health, Wu Aiying as
minister of justice, Tian Chengping as minister of labor and social security,
and Li Shenglin as minister of communications. At the provincial level, six
new appointments for secretaries of provincial committees were made—
Zhang Baoshun as secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee, Zhang
Qingli as acting secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee,
Qian Yunlu as secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee, Shi
Zongyuan as secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Committee, Zhang
Chunxian as secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Wang
Yang as secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Committee. In addition,
three persons were appointed provincial governors—Huang Xiaojing as
governor of Fujian Province, Wang Min as governor of Jilin Province, and
Yu Youjun as acting governor of Shanxi Province. Minister of Justice Wu
Aiying and Zhang Baoshun, secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee,
are among figures who rose up from the Chinese Communist Youth Corps,
from which President Hu Jintao also hails. As of the end of 2005, a total of
eight ministers in the State Council were from the Communist Youth
League of China. Whether Hu can send his close aides hailing from the
youth league and officials with whom he worked when he was secretary of
the Guizhou Provincial Committee or secretary of the Tibet Autonomous
Regional Committee to key posts can serve as a barometer to measure the
extent of his control of China in the future.
In December, a sweeping reshuffle of the Chinese military was con-
ducted, including a change of high-ranking officers at the People’s
Liberation Army. Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of General Staff, the No. 3
man at General Staff Headquarters, retired that month. Xiong was moved
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress after his
retirement. Zhang Qinsheng, assistant chief of General Staff, is expected
to be promoted to the post previously assumed by Xiong. It was decided
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that four Central Committee members would retire—Gen. Tang Tianbiao,
deputy director of the General Political Department of the PLA, Gen. Wen
Zongren, political commissar of the Academy of Military Sciences, Gen.
Jiang Futang, political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region, and
Gen. Liu Shutian, political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region.
The administration of President Hu conducted the latest personnel
reshuffle of the Chinese military on the pretext of implementing retire-
ment rules and rules that set tenures for posts. But the fact is that Hu has
launched a full-fledged campaign to control the military in an attempt to
reduce the influence of former president Jiang Zemin. Further reshuffling
of military personnel is expected to take place in the lead-up to the meet-
ing of the 17th National Congress of the CPC.
The Hu Jintao Administration’s Domestic Politics
The administration led by President Hu Jintao has begun to show its col-
ors in the way it is steering domestic politics. Here, we will focus on three
unique points of his administration. The first is the “scientific concept of
development,” which was upheld as a slogan for 2005 activities. Since
becoming general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Hu
has pushed for the promotion of a “scientific concept of development.”
This concept does not mean pursuing only speedier development or
higher growth rates. But it is a slogan aimed at achieving sustainable
growth by emphasizing a balance between development of urban and
rural areas, and giving priority to promoting environmental protection
and improving social security and other safety nets (People’s Daily,
November 25, 2005) At its Fifth Plenary Session from October 8 to
October 11, the 16th Central Committee of the CPC adopted a CPC pro-
posal on the formulation of the 11th Five-Year Long-Term Plan
(2006–11) for the national economy and social development (refer to
Economy). The adopted proposal included a statement that the “scientific
concept of development” should be fully pursued and implemented in the
execution of the 11th Five-Year Long-Term Plan. It also stated that by
promoting the “scientific concept of development,” economic and social
development should be controlled in a solid and unshakable manner. The
proposal argued that it is necessary for China to hold firm to the ideas of
making humans the basis of society, changing the concept of develop-
ment, innovating development models, improving the quality of develop-
ment, and placing economic and social development on a comprehensive,
harmonious, and sustainable development path. Summed up, the “scien-
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tific concept of development” was regarded as a prime mover for the
implementation of the 11th Five-Year Long-Term Plan.
Secondly, President Hu has proposed the building of “a harmonious
society.” This idea has often been floated along with the “scientific con-
cept of development” slogan. The government of President Hu has main-
tained that building “a harmonious society” is indispensable if China is to
promote the “scientific concept of development.” “A harmonious society”
is a slogan explicitly proposed at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th
Central Committee of the CPC in October 2004. The slogan has not been
adopted just to achieve economic development in China. It is also aimed
at realizing the creation of a society in which, (1) both urban and rural
areas can develop, (2) provincial areas will prosper, (3) economic devel-
opment and social development can go hand in hand, (4) humans and
nature can coexist harmoniously, and (5) domestic development is well
balanced with China’s opening to outside world. The government of
President Hu has launched a campaign to correct the growing social con-
tradictions gripping his country, such as the disparities between rich and
poor, which is a dark side of the nation’s rapid economic development,
problems of rural areas, and corruption of senior party officials. The CPC
Central Party School sponsored a seminar on February 19 to discuss how
to improve capabilities for the building of “a harmonious socialist soci-
ety.” At the seminar, President Hu appealed for the nation to move for-
ward toward steadily building “a harmonious socialist society,” under the
historical process of promoting the development of “socialist material civ-
ilization, political civilization, and spiritual civilization.”
The third idea being pushed forward by President Hu is an “education
campaign to preserve the advanced nature of party members.” The cam-
paign is meant to enhance senior CPC members’ policy-execution capabil-
ities, and eradicate official corruption involving them, by reeducating
them so that they can maintain the ideology and behavior expected of a
CCP member. The education campaign, launched in January 2005 and set
to run until June 2006, covers all of the approximately 68 million CPC
members. The campaign is roughly divided into three periods. Education
in the first period, from January to June 2005, was directed at CPC mem-
bers belonging to party organizations at prefectural or higher levels across
the nation, government institutions, companies, and business organiza-
tions. The second period, from June to December 2005, was for educating
party members belonging to jiceng zuzhi, basic community organizations
based in urban areas, such as residents committees, and organizations in
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townships. The third period, to run from January to June 2006, targets
party members in jiceng zuzhi, basic community organizations based in
rural areas.
Behind the Hu administration’s policy of pushing for an “education
campaign to preserve the advanced nature of party members,” is its will-
ingness to take new approaches in political management. The policy also
reflects the administration’s determination to deal with rampant corrup-
tion by CPC members, which has reached intolerable levels. Jia
Chunwang, procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate,
reported to the National People’s Congress that in 2004 a total of 43,757
public servants were criminally charged over corruption. Receiving bribes
was the most common form of corruption, with a total of 35,031 govern-
ment officials indicted on this charge. The number of public servants
arrested by investigative agencies for corruption amounted to 120 per day.
In 2004, 198 officials in bureau chief–level positions and 11 in section
chief–level were arrested over corruption. The trend, if left unattended,
could prompt the general public to question the Hu administration’s
political-management competence, eventually shaking the foundations of
its power base. Responding to this situation, Hu launched his “education
campaign to preserve the advanced nature of party members.” The cam-
paign, intended to significantly toughen discipline against party members,
is part of Hu’s efforts to solidify his political base.
The education campaign was first proposed at the Fourth Plenary
Session of the 15th Central Committee of the CPC in 2004, which
adopted a decision on strengthening the CPC’s policy-execution capabil-
ity. The decision stated that it is urgent for the CPC to improve the policy-
execution capability of party leaders, ranking party members and core
members, and eradicate corruption involving these officials. The CPC
then appealed for all party members to get united in starting the education
campaign to “preserve the advanced nature” of members, mainly by
implementing the so-called “Three Represents,” based on the idea that
imposing tougher discipline on members belonging to the smallest units
of the party and rank-and-file party members can help in building a party
with strong policy-execution capability. In November 2004, the CPC
announced its No. 20 Central Committee policy, in which the party for-
mally decided to implement the education campaign. On January 5, 2005,
the CPC convened a working conference on the education campaign to
“preserve the advanced nature” of Central Committee party members, at
which the party instructed members across China to start the campaign.
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Zeng Qinghong, member of the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, told the working conference that
all-level provincial party committees and all divisions of Central
Committee and State Council agencies should set up expert organizations
to concretize the education campaign. On January 14, CPC General
Secretary Hu Jintao attended a meeting of an expert panel on the cam-
paign and emphasized that “advanced nature” is a fundamental feature of
a Marxist political party. He said the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee would do its utmost to promote the “education campaign to
preserve the advanced nature of party members.”
Policy-execution Capability of Local Governments
While efforts to build “a harmonious society” based on the “scientific con-
cept of development,” and the “education campaign to preserve the
advanced nature of party members” proceeds smoothly, the policy-execu-
tion capability of local government officials is being increasingly ques-
tioned in recent years. The closed nature of local governments was
revealed when an explosion leading to the contamination of the Songhua
River occurred in November 2005. On November 13 of that year, a petro-
chemical plant run by Jilin Petrochemical Company under China
National Petroleum Corp. exploded, causing harmful chemicals to pour
into the Songhua River, at levels far in excess of the maximum set under
environmental standards. On November 21, the government of Harbin
City in Heilongjiang Province announced suspension of the water supply,
citing the need to inspect and repair water-supply facilities in the city.
However, on November 22, the city government revised the previous
day’s announcement, saying that the Songhua River may have been conta-
minated due to the explosion of a petrochemical plant in Jilin Province.
The contamination of the river was not revealed to the general public
until more than 10 days after the explosion occurred. On November 26,
Premier Wen made an unscheduled visit to Harbin City to inspect the
contamination of the river. On December 2, Xie Zhenhua, director of the
State Administration of Environmental Protection, was dismissed from his
post, to take blame for the accident. Zhou Shengxian was appointed to
replace him. Xinhua News Agency quoted the governor of the
Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Government as saying that Harbin City
lied about the incident as part of information control, terming the action
“a well-intentioned lie” meant to prevent confusion (November 27,
2005). But in view of the seriousness of the accident, which resulted in a
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number of fatalities, the handling of the matter by Chinese authorities
served to promote distrust toward them, both at home and abroad.
In 2005, major accidents continued to occur at coal mines in China.
According to statistics compiled by the State Administration of Work
Safety Supervision, a total of 5,986 people were killed in coal mine acci-
dents. The number of coal mine accidents amounted to 3,341 for the year,
down 8.2 percent from the preceding year. However, the number of coal
mine accidents resulting in the deaths of 30 or more people totaled 11, up
3 from the previous year. Ensuring a stable supply of coal is important to
China, because it is directly related to state energy policy. The Chinese
government has stepped up efforts to strengthen its ability to control
work safety, aiming to achieve the dual objectives of ensuring a stable coal
supply and establishing a safety systems at coal mines. According to the
People’s Daily, in 2005 Li Yi, director of the State Administration of Work
Safety Supervision, ordered the closure of more than four thousand coal
mines that were deemed to be significantly lacking in safety measures, and
punished 222 officials for major accidents, including two vice governors
of provinces (December 24, 2005). Of these 222, 96 officials were crimi-
nally charged.
As social contradictions such as corruption and bribery involving
senior party members, and widening disparity between the rich and poor,
have spread across China in recent years, “incidents caused by collective
people,” particularly riots by poor farmers, migrant workers, and jobless
people, have occurred frequently. According to the Ministry of Public
Security, the number of “collective incidents” jumped from 10,000 in
1994 to 74,000 in 2004, and the number of people participating in them
soared fivefold in the 10-year period—from 730,000 to 3.76 million. Most
of the incidents are believed to have been triggered by compulsory land
expropriation in farm areas by local governments. Riots were often pro-
voked by the land expropriation methods used by local governments,
which were often in violation of spirit of the central government. An
analysis published in Issue 29 (July 18, 2005) of Liaowang [Outlook] con-
cluded that, (1) some local governments are undemocratic in their land
expropriation policy, earning profits through resale of the expropriated
land to third parties, (2) standard levels of compensation are unfairly low,
and (3) bureaucrats and real estate companies have colluded in profiteer-
ing. In June for example, an armed group comprising an estimated 200 to
300 people, apparently hired by the local government, attacked farmers
who were staging a sit-in in Dingzhou City, Hebei Province, protesting
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the lack of adequate compensation for the land taken from them, leaving
at least six protesters dead. In the village of Donghua in Shanwei City,
Guangdong Province, local people opposing the construction of a wind
power plant clashed with armed police in December, leaving many of
them dead and injured. The shooting by the armed police, the biggest
crackdown by authorities on ordinary citizens since the Tiananmen
Square Incident, left 20 people dead and 50 missing, according to the New
York Times (December 10, 2005).
The Impact of the Death of Zhao Ziyang
Former CPC general secretary Zhao Ziyang died on January 17, aged 85.
Yet, oddly, no official memorial service was conducted for him. When
Zhao was cremated at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in the sub-
urbs of Beijing, some government officials, including Jia Qinglin, chair-
man of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, attended
the cremation. In an obituary, Xinhua News Agency said that comrade
Zhao Ziyang had assumed a succession of key posts in the central Chinese
government and the state and made a meaningful contribution to the CPC
and the Chinese people. But the news agency, referring to his role in the
Tiananmen Square incident, added that comrade Zhao had made a serious
mistake during the politically turbulent period of the spring and summer
of 1989 (January 29, 2005). In the 16 years since being dismissed from
key posts, following the incident, former president Zhao remained absent
from the center stage of politics. Even after death, his honor was not
regained. Several newspapers linked to Hong Kong and Taiwan reported
that the Chinese government severely restricted moves by people who
wanted to express their condolences over Zhao’s death or attend a funeral
service for him. The restriction is believed to have reflected a sense of cri-
sis by the Chinese government, which apparently tried to minimize the
impact of Zhao’s death by preventing protests by pro-democracy activists
or other activities that might promote anti-establishment feeling. The
Chinese government was not taking any chances, even after the death of
an old man who had been away from the public stage for many years. This
indicates a lack of confidence by the Chinese government, as the country
is gripped by fears of rekindled democracy protests.
Even as it was trying to suppress anti-establishment moves by pro-
democracy forces, on October 19, 2005, the Chinese government released
a white paper called “Building of Political Democracy in China”—the first
white paper by the Chinese government addressing such a theme. The
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white paper contains a philosophical framework for political-system
reforms geared to building a political democracy in China, and outlines
what the government has done so far in order to achieve such a democ-
racy. The paper says, “China’s democracy is a people’s democracy under
the leadership of the CPC, a democracy of the widest scope practiced
among the people, and China’s democracy is a democracy guaranteed by
the people’s democratic dictatorship.” It also says, “China’s efforts to
build a political democracy have yielded numerous advancements and
achievements.” However, the idea of “political democracy,” as stated in
the title of the white paper, is far removed from the reality of China’s cur-
rent political system, in which democratization has made little progress.
The term “the people’s democratic dictatorship” used in the white paper
aptly reflects the reality of China’s democratic situation. Yet, by releasing
the white paper, China seems to be trying to demonstrate to Europe, the
United States, and rest of the international community, that it is making
every effort to advance democratization. It has been suggested that one of
China’s motivations in taking this initiative is to pave the way for the
European Union (EU) to lift an embargo on China-bound arms exports.
The EU has refused to lift it, citing the perceived slow democratization in
China and the country’s human rights abuse (refer to Foreign Relations).
The Problem of Ethnic Minorities in China
The year 2005 marked the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the
Tibet Autonomous Region and the 50th anniversary of the establishment
of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. When a national working
conference on ethnic minorities was held on May 27, 2005, Chinese
President Hu and Premier Wen called for unity of peoples and economic
development in residential areas for ethnic minorities. The Tibet
Autonomous Region held a celebration in September to mark the 40th
anniversary of its establishment, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region did similarly in October to mark its 50th anniversary. Both cele-
brations were marked by great pomp and splendor. The Standing
Committee members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee visited the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region one after
another—Huang Ju in July, Zeng Qinghong in August, and Luo Gan in
October. At a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region at the end of July,
the autonomous region’s vice chairman, Zhang Zhou, was dismissed.
Under the reshuffle, Hu Wei, secretary of the Secretariat of the Central
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Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, was appointed to
replace Zhang.
As celebrations were taking place, speculation was rife that protesters
had clashed with armed police in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region. In an apparent attempt to deny the rumors, PLA Daily reported
that the PLA Xinjiang Military Area Command regards militias and sol-
diers in the reserves as an important force for maintaining the security
and stability of the autonomous region (October 1, 2005). The daily also
reported on the same day that of all the senior military officers of the area
command, contingency troop soldiers, militias, and officers and soldiers
in the reserves, not a single person had joined splintered forces or con-
ducted nonreligious activities. However, it is difficult to feel entirely opti-
mistic about the situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region,
given remarks made by Wang Lequan, secretary of the CPC Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Regional Committee, on August 25, to the effect that
the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is seeing a growing presence of
international terrorist organizations and increasingly violent terrorist
activities. Wang also said on October 18 that 19 foreign terrorists were
arrested during the period to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the estab-
lishment of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
Hong Kong
Tung Chee-Hwa, chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, resigned on March 10, despite the fact that his second term had
yet to expire, citing the deterioration of his health. On the same day, he
became vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference. Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, administrative secretary, became
acting chief executive in place of Tung. The reshuffle reflected the desires
of the mainland, which was unhappy with Tung’s unpopularity with the
people of Hong Kong, and his incompetent policy execution, which had
become increasingly clear since protesters staged a large-scale demonstra-
tion against the enactment of the state security ordinance in July 2003. On
June 21, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen was formally appointed chief executive
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, after a unanimous elec-
tion procedure. Probably because the resignation of Tung served to pla-
cate the people of Hong Kong, a street rally staged in July to mark the
eighth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the mainland was limited in
scale, with only about twenty thousand people participating. Still, it was
true that the Hong Kong government and the democracy camp were
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divided over the reform of an electoral system. In October, the Hong Kong
government announced a proposed package to reform Hong Kong’s elec-
toral system, including doubling the number of members of the Election
Committee that indirectly elects Hong Kong’s chief executive. Still, the
democracy camp demanded complete direct election of the chief execu-
tive, putting it into direct confrontation with the Hong Kong government.
This demand led to a large-scale rally of about 250,000 people in
December. The Hong Kong government–proposed reform was later
rejected by Hong Kong’s legislature, the Legislative Council. When Chief
Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen made an official visit to Beijing at the
end of December, Chinese President Hu Jintao told him that he was satis-
fied with the policies of the Hong Kong government, adding that China
would provide full support to the government.
Taiwan
In early 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao, at a New Year tea party spon-
sored by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,
expressed hopes for an early resumption of dialogue with the government
across the Taiwan Straits, after an effective deadlock between the two
countries. Hu told the tea party that he hoped for the resumption of cross-
straits dialogue and negotiations as early as possible, under the basic
policy of realizing “peaceful reunification” and preserving “the one coun-
try, two systems policy,” and upholding the principle of “one China.”
Later, one after another leaders of Taiwan’s opposition parties visited
mainland China. Lien Chan, chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), visited
China on April 26, and James Soong, chairman of the People First Party,
visited on May 5, both meeting with Chinese President Hu. The KMT
chairman’s visit to Beijing led to the first KMT-CPC meeting since
Taiwan’s split from China. On this political development, the Mirror, a
media organ of mainland China, reported in June 2005 that KMT
Chairman Lien Chan and People First Party Chairman James Soong
accepted the principle of “one China,” and acknowledged the 1992
Consensus, which, according to the interpretation of mainland China,
calls for China and Taiwan to maintain the principle of “one China,”
putting aside differences on political views. The Mirror also reported that
the two Taiwanese opposition parties shared the idea of opposing
Taiwan’s independence with mainland China, enabling the KMT and the
People First Party to form a strategic partnership to achieve cross-straits
peace, and the happiness of people on both sides of the straits. 
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While the Chinese administration of President Hu Jintao welcomed the
visit to Beijing by the leaders of the two Taiwanese opposition parties, this
does not necessarily mean that the Hu administration has softened its stance
on Taiwan. During their meeting with Hu, both Lien Chan and James Soong
refrained from touching on mainland China’s adoption of the Anti-
Secession Law. This clearly indicates that the contact between the CPC and
the Taiwanese opposition parties was made on the initiative of the main-
land. The visits to Beijing by the leaders of the two Taiwanese opposition
parties were prompted mainly by the intensifying political struggle between
ruling and opposition parties in Taiwan, and the state of disarray of
Taiwan’s policy toward mainland China as the Chen Shui-bian–led admin-
istration became a lame duck. China apparently contacted the leaders of the
Taiwanese opposition parties in an attempt to isolate the administration of
Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party, a pro-independence
party that has steadfastly refused dialogue with mainland China. It is diffi-
cult to rule out the possibility of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian tak-
ing “bold” action during the remaining period of his presidency, since he
has been cornered both on the domestic and diplomatic fronts.
(by Haruka Matsumoto)
ECONOMY
The National Bureau of Statistics conducted China’s first comprehensive
economic census from 2004 to 2005, covering business corporations and
offices in the secondary and tertiary industries. On December 6, 2005, the
bureau released the outline of results of the census, and 2004 GDP figures
were revised based on the census results. According to the bureau,
China’s GDP amounted to 15,987.8 billion yuan in 2004, an upward revi-
sion of 16.8 percent from the previously reported figure. A revision of this
magnitude was rare even for China, where statistics are frequently
revised. The bureau explained that the GDP figures needed to be revised
mainly because the conventional method of statistical calculation did not
fully reflect the performance of various kinds of service industries—a part
of the economy that has advanced rapidly in recent years. In early January
of 2006, the bureau released revised figures for GDP and growth rates ret-
rospective to 1993.
Based on the results of the census, GDP for 2005 was estimated at a
preliminary 18,232.1 billion yuan, equivalent to US$2,225.7 billion after
People’s Republic of China | 101
taking account of a 2.1 percent appreciation of the renminbi against the
US dollar in July (to be explained later). The figure indicates that the size
of China’s economy is about half that of Japan in terms of GDP, making it
the world’s fourth largest economy after Germany. There is still space to
question the reliability of the statistics presented by the government, but
China is undeniably becoming a major economic power in the world.
China maintained an impressive economic growth rate, equal to an
annualized 9.9 percent in 2005, despite continued credit tightening,
mainly in the first half of the year. The country’s supply capacity
expanded sharply due to booming investment in the real estate and mate-
rial sectors, signs of adjustment loomed increasingly larger in response to
the supply glut. Exports scored significant growth but imports tended to
slacken. As a result, China’s trade surplus in 2005 jumped 319 percent
from the previous year, to US$101.9 billion, surpassing the surplus regis-
tered by Japan. Affected by the rapid increase in trade surplus and contin-
ued influx of capital, the balance of China’s foreign currency reserves
amounted to US$818.9 billion at the end of the year, a figure expected to
swell further and exceed Japan’s balance some time in 2006. 
With China wielding a growing influence on the world economy, as it
becomes a major economic power, the country’s trade and investment
frictions, particularly with developed countries, have intensified. An
important task for China in its economic policy management is to explore
ways to achieve the country’s harmonious integration into the global
economy, while dealing with various economic imbalances and contradic-
tions gripping the country domestically.
Signs of Change in Economic Outlook
While the Chinese economy has been growing excessively since 2003, the
government has continued to face a delicate phase in its economic man-
agement. The economic growth rate of 9.9 percent recorded for 2005 was
slightly lower than the 10.1 percent (revised in line with the GDP revi-
sion) of 2004. Fixed capital formation, which had led growth on the
demand side, grew by 25.7 percent in 2005, almost unchanged from the
preceding year. The ratio of fixed capital formation to total GDP stood at
48.6 percent in 2005, and the absolute scale of capital formation exceeded
that of Japan. Industrial production for the year showed high growth,
roughly comparable to the previous year’s level.
While macroeconomic statistics showed that the Chinese economy
continued to grow smoothly in 2005, microeconomic indicators showed
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signs of change in the year. For example, inventories grew markedly in the
materials industries, such as steel, nonferrous metals, cements, and sheet
glass, which had been investing heavily in plant and equipment investment
since 2003. On the other hand, investment and production continued to
grow sharply. In 2005, growth in steel production was similar to the previ-
ous year’s levels. Output of steel by China amounted to 370 million tons in
2005, accounting for almost one-third of global production. The amount is
said to have exceeded market demand by about 100 million tons, resulting
in a sharp decline in prices of steel products. In response to falling steel
prices, the China Iron & Steel Industry Association called for a 5 percent
output cut in October for some steel items, but the appeal had little effect.
Reflecting the downswing in steel product prices, profits in the materials
industries grew only marginally or declined in 2005—a turnaround from
the sizable profit growth of the preceding year. The auto industry contin-
ued to expand production with the number of vehicles produced by
Chinese makers exceeding that by German carmakers, making China the
world’s No. 3, after only the United States and Japan. However, profits of
Chinese automakers fell, with profit-to-sales ratio declining sharply in
2005, to below the overall average for Chinese manufacturers.
In the real estate sector, concern over excessive investment is growing.
According to the February 21, 2005 issue of Finance (Caijing), the
Shanghai branch of the People’s Bank of China (the central bank) warned
in a report to the bank’s head office that lending for property-related deals
has expanded excessively, posing a risk that China’s real estate bubble
may burst. The property market in China has apparently become increas-
ingly speculative, in view of the fact that rent increases have been smaller
than property price rises. In regions like Shanghai, where speculative
moves in real estate markets had started relatively early, soaring real estate
prices have become a social issue. Responding to the upswing in real
estate prices, the General Office of the State Council issued a notice in late
March, in an attempt to gradually arrest the surge in housing prices. At
meeting of its standing members in early May, the State Council studied
how to restrict real estate transactions. In the first half of 2005, the central
government thus furthered measures to try and take some air out of the
real-estate bubble. The State Council, for example, endorsed and issued
“some opinions concerning the implementation of policies to stabilize
housing prices,” which were put forward by seven ministries and commis-
sions of the State Council, including the Ministry of Construction and the
State Development Planning Commission.
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However, in view of its consequences, this policy change in favor of
slowing the real estate bubble was adopted too late. A series of tightening
measures by the government, targeting the property market, significantly
changed the supply-demand balance of the market in Chinese cities, par-
ticularly in Shanghai. Real estate prices in the city, which had seen smaller
increases in 2004, temporarily swung upward between the fourth quarter
of 2004 and the first quarter of 2005. But price growth later fell again.
With property prices coming under falling pressure in the city, potential
buyers have sat on the sideline, even causing prices to decline in some
regions. Responding to the downswing in real estate prices, the property
industry started to campaign against the government’s restrictive real
estate policy, arguing that excessive measures to limit property transac-
tions are detrimental to economy. The Chinese government then softened
the tightening policy and started fine-tuning relevant measures in the
middle of 2005, apparently reflecting its concerns that violent fluctuations
in real estate prices due to tightening would negatively affect the nation’s
financial sector and the economy as a whole. However, the real estate
market had already shown signs that the bubble came close to bursting,
such as the non-utilization rate of land plots for commercial development
reaching 25 percent. According to the February 10, 2006 issue of 21st
Century Business Herald (21 Shiji Jingji Baodao), the effective non-
utilization rates of commercial land were said to have risen more sharply
than official government statistics showed. The bursting of the real estate
bubble is expected to have further impact on China’s property market in
2006.
The highest-priority economic management task for 2006, as defined
by the Chinese government at a working conference on the economy in
December—as too in the previous year—was to achieve high economic
growth in a sustainable manner, and continuously curb excessive invest-
ment growth. The working conference referred to the need to heed a nec-
essary principle for achieving this economic management policy—“keep
what should be kept and curb what should be curbed”—as well as the
need to move toward trying to achieve economic growth through con-
sumption. These references indicate that the Chinese monetary authority
had softened its restrictive stance on industrial activity. According to the
November 7, 2005 issue of Economic Observer (Jingji Guancha Bao), there
is speculation that the authority has been moving to slightly relax mea-
sures to curb lending.
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Revival of Industrial Policy?
The National Development and Reform Commission was created when
the State Development Planning Commission was expanded through the
absorption of a part of the State Economic and Trade Commission, as part
of administrative reforms in 2003. The new entity has been reinforcing its
policy interference in activities for industrial development. The renewed
move by the entity has come at a time when excessive corporate invest-
ment in certain sectors has been emerging. The Communist Party of
China (CPC), at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee
in October, worked out a CPC proposal on the compilation of the 11th
Five-Year Plan, as 2005 marked the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan.
The proposal would serve as a basis for a plan to be adopted by the
National People’s Congress in March 2006. (The word jihua [plan] used
previously was changed to guihua, which means “vision” rather than
“plan,” although the official English translation remains unchanged.)
Reference to specific industries under the proposed 11th Five-Year Plan
was very limited. Specific policies involving individual industrial sectors
are to be addressed by administrative laws, rules, and guidelines being for-
mulated mainly by the National Development and Reform Commission.
Industrial policies adopted to cover major industries included a
revised auto industry policy, introduced in June 2004. The auto industry
policy was followed by a steel industry development policy, which was
introduced by the National Development and Reform Commission in July
2005. The steel industry development policy calls for steel manufacturers
to curb production, in response to the excessive level of current invest-
ment, to promote industrial rationalization, to enhance productivity, to
improve the quality of products and process technologies, and to take
account of environmental effects in manufacturing activities. As in the
case of the auto industry policy, the steel industry policy is restrictive, as
measures envisaged under the policy include the requirement of screening
and approval for new steel projects by the National Development and
Reform Commission, and the effective banning of the full acquisition of
Chinese steelmakers by foreign-affiliated companies. In addition, at the
end of the year the National Development and Reform Commission issued
an administrative notice concerning curbing of steel production, scrap-
ping of outmoded facilities and technologies, and acceleration of struc-
tural adjustment in the steel industry. The notice called for steel produc-
tion in the country to be limited to 400 million tons during the 11th
Five-Year Plan period (2006–10).
People’s Republic of China | 105
On December 21, the State Council also approved and issued a tenta-
tive rule on the promotion of industry structural adjustment, which was
proposed by the National Development and Reform Commission. As a
principle of this adjustment, while the rule emphasizes the need to
smooth basic functioning through the market mechanism of allocating
business resources, it calls for “the state to optimize resource allocation
further by means of rational guidance of industrial policy (Article 3).”
More specifically, the National Development and Reform Commission is
to take the initiative of compiling a set of guidelines on industry structural
adjustment for application to discriminatory policies of taxation and
investment licensing, by categorizing products, facilities, and technolo-
gies into three categories—those of which production is to be encouraged,
those of which production is to be limited, and those of which production
is to be terminated (Article 12 to Article 19). At the same time, the com-
mission released specific guidelines to be used for the time being.
Thanks to administrative reforms, the National Development and
Reform Commission has been able to regain the control over industrial
policy given to it when it was called the State Planning Commission. At a
time when the problems of excessive investment and production have
become more visible, the National Development and Reform Commission
has again shown its willingness to interfere in microeconomic activities.
However, in view of China’s past handling of industrial policy, almost all
administrative interventions made for the purpose of adjusting supply-
demand balances and economies of scale are soon swept away by the
dynamism of market forces. In order to remedy the tendency of excessive
investment, which is a chronic problem for China, the country has no
option but to transform its financial system, which plays the role of
resources allocation, into a market-based system, and to introduce a
mechanism that can end inefficient resources allocation.
Currency Reform and Revaluation of the Renminbi
On the trade front, China’s import growth slowed significantly in the first
quarter of 2005, affected by restrictive policy and changes in the domestic
market. On the other hand, exports grew sharply, resulting in the coun-
try’s trade surplus surging to US$16.5 billion as of the end of the first
quarter—an amount that represents close to half of its trade surplus for all
of 2004. In view of these circumstances, Japan, the United States, and
Europe urged China to reform its currency system as soon as possible. In
the United States, the political community accelerated moves to link
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China’s swelling trade surplus with the problem of the renminbi, includ-
ing congressional moves to push the so-called Schumer Graham bill,
which would impose a uniform 27.5 percent punitive tariff on Chinese
imports unless Beijing drastically reforms its currency system (refer to the
next section).
Meanwhile, when Premier Wen Jiabao unveiled three principles for
the reform of the renminbi at an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of finance
ministers in late June, the Chinese government encountered international
pressure, from Japan, Europe, and the United States. These principles are:
(1) China will decide reforms of the Chinese exchange rate system by
itself, (2) reform decisions are to be made in a controlled manner, and (3)
time will be taken to implement reforms (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 27,
2005). On the evening of July 21, however, the People’s Bank of China
announced a set of measures to reform its currency rate regime—a move
that surprised global financial markets. In a public notice, the Chinese
central bank said it would revalue the exchange rate of the renminbi to
8.11 to the US dollar, amounting to a 2.1 percent appreciation of the
Chinese currency. The central bank also announced it would adopt a
managed floating rate system that uses a basket of currencies as a refer-
ence for the renminbi exchange rate (Table 6.1). The margin of revalua-
tion was very small, but Chinese monetary authorities effectively ended
the pegging of the renminbi to the US dollar. The possibility of the ren-
minbi fluctuating more against the US dollar increased, in view of the dec-
laration by the central bank that “the renminbi exchange rate regime will
be improved with greater flexibility,” with consideration to the renminbi’s
value relative to other key currencies. In August, People’s Bank of China
Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said currencies making up the “basket” in the
new exchange rate regime are the US dollar, euro, yen, and won.
However, the governor also pointed out that using a basket of currencies
as a reference does not amount to tying the renminbi to a basket of cur-
rencies, suggesting that the basket is only a reference for deciding the
yuan’s exchange rate.
Since the reform of the foreign exchange rate system, the yuan has
been gradually appreciating against the US dollar in inter-banking trading
(Figure 6.1). The margin of revaluation between July 22, a day after the
public notice was announced, and December 31 was only 0.5 percent, but
the yuan’s appreciation against the US currency apparently showed some
upward momentum during November and December. During this period,
Chinese monetary authorities took a series of additional measures to
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reform the exchange rate system. Among them were the introduction of a
market-maker system for inter-banking trading, the creation of a currency
futures market, the expansion of a maximum allowable fluctuation range
for exchange rates offered by banks to general customers, and the scrap-
ping of a maximum allowable currency fluctuation range in trading of
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Table 6.1. Public Announcements of the People’s Bank of China on 
Reforming the Renminbi Exchange Rate Regime
Source: Website of the People’s Bank of China (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/).
(preamble omitted)
1. Starting in July 21, 2005, China will reform its exchange rate regime, by 
moving to a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply 
and demand, with reference to a basket of currencies. The renminbi will no 
longer be pegged to the US dollar and the renminbi exchange rate regime 
will be improved with greater flexibility.
2. After the closing of the market on each working day, the People’s Bank of 
China will announce the closing price of the US dollar and other foreign 
currencies traded against the renminbi in the inter-bank foreign exchange 
market, and will make this the central parity for trading against the 
renminbi on the following working day.
3. The US$-renminbi exchange rate will be adjusted to 8.11 yuan per US dollar 
at 19:00 hours on July 21, 2005. The adjusted quote will be used as the 
central parity for the US dollar’s trading against the renminbi between 
foreign exchange—designated banks in the inter-banking currency market 
on the following working day. (remainder omitted)
4. The daily trading price of the US dollar against the renminbi in the inter-
bank foreign exchange market will be allowed to continue floating within a 
band of ±0.3 percent around the central parity published by the People’s 
Bank of China. (remainder omitted)
?The People’s Bank of China will adjust the renminbi exchange rate band 
when necessary, according to market development, and the economic and 
financial situation. The renminbi exchange rate will be more flexible, since it 
will be based on market conditions, with reference to a basket of currencies. 
The People’s Bank of China is responsible for maintaining the stability of the 
renminbi exchange rate at an adaptive and balanced level, so as to promote a 
basic equilibrium of the balance of payments, and to safeguard macroeconomic 
and financial stability.
currencies other than the US dollar. In the future, the authorities are
likely to expand the permissible fluctuation range for the yuan on cur-
rency markets, and tolerate a gradual acceleration in the yuan’s apprecia-
tion against the US dollar, while keeping a close tab on domestic eco-
nomic developments and external relations.
Intensification of Trade Friction
Trade friction between China and developed countries over textile prod-
ucts intensified in 2005. Export quotas for US- and European-bound
Chinese textile products were scrapped at the end of 2004 in line with
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. But by the time the quotas
were removed, textile trade friction had already intensified between
China, and the United States and Europe. Following the scrapping of the
export quotas, China imposed a unit tax on shipment of 31 major textile
products on January 1, in an attempt to block moves by the United States
and Europe to introduce measures to restrict trade. Despite the tax,
growth in textile exports from China to the United States and Europe was
far higher than projected at the beginning of 2005. The surge occurred
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Source: Website of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. http://www.safe.gov.cn.
Figure 6.1. Movement of the Renminbi (after July 22/median rates released 
by the People’s Bank of China) 
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mainly because the United States and Europe postponed the scrapping of
the export quotas for most product items until the end of 2004, although
WTO agreements say that a quota system must be abolished in phases.
US-bound exports of major textile items rose sharply, with shipments of
cotton shirts and jackets jumping 1,250 percent from the year before,
shipments of cotton pants 1,500 percent, and shipments of cotton and
synthetic fiber underwear 300 percent (based on Chinese customs-clear-
ance statistics. Economic Observer [Jingji Guancha Bao], April 11, 2005).
In response to a sharp increase in textile imports from China, the
United States and the European Union (EU) further stepped up protec-
tionist moves. Acting on a request filed by textile producers within the
common market, in April the EU released a set of guidelines on the use of
a safeguard aimed at targeting EU-bound Chinese textile products. The
guidelines called for the EU to begin investigation on whether to invoke
safeguard measures when the increase in Chinese textile imports into
Europe reaches a specified level. The moment the guidelines were
announced, the EU launched safeguard investigation into nine items
imported from China, including sweaters, pants, and white shirts.
Meanwhile, the United States decided to invoke safeguard measures
against seven textile items from China, including sweaters, pants, and
white shirts, to limit growth in imports of such items to 7.5 percent.
China expressed opposition to these trade restrictions by the United
States and Europe. At the same time, however, in an apparent bid to ease
trade frictions, on May 20 Beijing voluntarily announced a substantial
increase in the tax on 74 textile items shipped from China, effective June
1. Despite these self-restraint efforts by the Chinese, the United States did
not remove the safeguard measures against the seven items, while the EU
continued its safeguard investigations into textile imports from China.
Reacting strongly against the tough stance of the United States and the
EU, China reversed the self-imposed export-tax hike just 10 days after it
was implemented. Reflecting uncertainty over the outcome of trade dis-
putes involving the three parties, moves to refrain from buying Chinese
textile products spread throughout the United States and Europe, dealing
a severe blow to Chinese textile makers, particularly small- and medium-
sized companies.
In an attempt to break the deadlock, China began separate textile-
trade negotiations with the United States and the EU in pursuit of com-
promise deals. Negotiations with the EU progressed relatively quickly,
resulting in an agreement on June 10, calling for China to set a provi-
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sional export limit for 10 major textile items, effective until the end of
2007. At the same time, the EU was to end safeguard investigation into
these items. According to a memorandum exchanged between China and
the EU as part of the compromise agreement, growth of EU-bound ship-
ments of the 10 specified textile products would be limited to 8 percent to
12.5 percent per year in the prescribed period. The memorandum also
called for the EU to refrain from taking safeguard measures against other
Chinese textile products under its safeguard clause on Chinese textile
imports. The EU side was believed to have taken a cautious stance in its
negotiations with China, in view of a divergence in textile-trade policies
amongst EU member countries. Southern European countries like France
and Italy gave priority to protecting domestic textile industries, while
Scandinavian countries were more willing to buy cheaper Chinese prod-
ucts (Finance [Caijing], June 13, 2005). Soon after the memorandum was
exchanged, the volume of textile imports for several items from China had
already reached limits set for 2005 by August. As a result, a large volume
of Chinese products were rejected by customs-clearance offices, and left
to pile up at European ports. Meanwhile, distribution businesses in
Scandinavian countries demanded the removal of the EU-imposed import
restrictions step for Chinese textile products, highlighting a deepening
confrontation between EU member countries due to conflicts of interest
(21st Century Business Herald [21 Shiji Jingji Baodao], August 29, 2005).
China also held textile trade negotiations with the United States, seek-
ing to strike a compromise deal similar to that it concluded with the EU.
However, talks did not proceed smoothly, due to a wide gulf between the
two countries. In early November, the two parties finally struck a deal and
exchanged a memorandum under which maximum import growth rates
for 21 mainstay textile products from China were set at 10 percent to 17
percent per year, for the period from January 2006 to the end of 2008. As
in the case of the EU, the memorandum also called for the United States to
refrain from applying safeguard clause measures to other textile imports
from China.
How textile trade friction with the United States and the EU unfolds is
very important to the Chinese textile industry, since the US and European
markets account for about 30 percent of all textile products shipped from
China. China managed to avoid an immediate crisis due to the compro-
mise deals with the United States and the EU, but many uncertainties will
reemerge when the deal with the United States expires at the end of 2008.
US and European textile distributors have been moving to diversify their
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product sourcing in light of the business risks associated with importing
only from China (Asian Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2005).
Bargaining over Investment for Natural Resources
Development
China also encountered some trade friction with the United States in
relation to investment for natural resources development. In view of its
increasing reliance on imports of mineral resources such as oil, China’s
major state-run natural resources and materials enterprises have stepped
up efforts to secure supplies of natural resources through mergers and
acquisitions, and capital investment, with the support of the Chinese
government.
The case attracting the greatest media attention was an offer made by
China’s CNOOC in June to buy out US oil company Unocal. CNOOC
offered a staggering bid price of US$18.5 billion for Unocal, exceeding a
price offered by Chevron, which was also seeking to purchase the US
company. The Chinese move became a political issue in the United States,
however, because some critics considered it a threat to the United States’
security in natural resources supply. Finally, CNOOC was forced to end
their buyout negotiations with Unocal, resulting in the company being
bought by Chevron for US$17.7 billion. CNOOC later stated that it had to
give up the proposed deal due to political pressure from Washington (The
Nikkei, August 3, 2005). In light of the fact that Unocal produces only 1
percent of all crude oil and petroleum gas produced in the United States,
some observers suggested that blocking a purchase of the company by
Chinese interests on the grounds of the possible effects to resources secu-
rity was irrational (Johan Norberg, “China Paranoia Derails Free Trade,”
Far Eastern Economic Review, January-February 2006).
Meanwhile, China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), the largest oil
company in China, succeeded in buying PetroKazakhstan of Canada for
US$4.18 billion at the end of October. Behind the deal was the mediation
of the Chinese government between CNPC and China Petrochemical and
Chemical Corp. (CINOPEC), another Chinese petroleum giant that had
also been eager to purchase PetroKazakhstan. It was believed that the
Chinese government persuaded CINOPEC to refrain from participating in
the tender to buy PetroKazakhstan (Finance [Caijing], February 6, 2006).
The Chinese government, in partnership with state-owned compa-
nies, has accelerated efforts to acquire oil concessions overseas and
deepen relations with oil-producing countries, in a bid to expand the
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potential sources from which it can directly buy oil resources. China’s
moves to approach Syria, Sudan, and Iran, countries hostile to the United
States, are believed to be part of this strategy, making Americans wary of
such developments.
Advancement of China’s Financial Reform
A major factor behind the surge of investment in China in recent years
has been the delayed efforts by the Chinese banking sector—the Big
Four state-owned banks—to shift to a market-based economy. In view
of the planned abolition of rules limiting foreign capital investment at
the end of 2006, China needs to urgently reform its domestic banking
sector, so that banks can operate in a more efficient manner. Apparently
mindful of the need for such reform, the Chinese government has been
transforming state-owned banks into listed stockholding companies,
and pushing for capital investment by foreign entities, particularly
major financial institutions.
China Construction Bank and the Bank of China, both of which
became stockholding companies in 2004, have promoted organizational
reforms with an eye to getting their stocks listed on overseas stock mar-
kets. China Construction Bank faced a serious scandal in March, when its
president Zhang Xizhao was dismissed due to allegations of taking bribes.
Yet the bank was able to receive an additional 65.5 billion yuan in capital
injection thanks to reinvestment by Central Huijin Investment Co., an
entity charged with managing state assets in the financial sector, and
income tax returns. In addition, China Construction Bank succeeded in
getting the Bank of America and Temasek Holdings, an investment com-
pany affiliated with the government of Singapore, to acquire 8.379 per-
cent and 6.125 percent equity stakes in the bank, respectively. The capital
injection helped put the state-owned bank on a sound financial footing,
enabling it to get listed on the Hong Kong stock market at the end of
October. This stock offering raised a remarkable HK$62.2 billion, making
it the most lucrative public offering of shares since 2002. Meanwhile, the
Bank of China, another state-owned bank, reached a broad agreement on
capital investment with the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Temasek
Holdings. However, the bank was not able to complete its restructuring,
and it failed to go public within the year. This was because it took longer
than expected for Central Huijin Investment to coordinate the investment
deal, which required agreements on capital investment ratios by each
party, and per-share purchase prices.
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The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest bank in
China, restructured its assets by separating or disposing of nearly 800 bil-
lion yuan in nonperforming loans and quasi-nonperforming loans, after
receiving a US$15 billion capital injection from Central Huijin Investment
in April. As a result, the bank successfully transformed itself into a stock-
holding company. In a bid to catch up with the Bank of China, the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has been in negotiations with
several foreign-affiliated companies, seeking capital investment from
institutional investors, mainly major foreign-affiliated financial institu-
tions. It aims to go public in 2006.
Shares of China Construction Bank rose after they were listed on the
Hong Kong stock market, earning the foreign companies that invested in
the bank substantial capital gains, as the market price of shares topped
their purchasing price. If listed on a stock market, shares in the Bank of
China are likely to rise just as those of China Construction Bank did, trig-
gering criticism by some media that the move is tantamount to selling
shares of domestic Chinese banks to foreign-affiliated companies at bar-
gain prices. But the China Banking Regulatory Commission dismissed
such criticism and emphasized its policy of continuing to promote capital
investment in Chinese banks by foreign-affiliated institutional investors.
The commission argued that the policy would not lead to bargain selling
of Chinese banks to foreign interests, due to a set of safeguard measures,
including the minimum level of foreign ownership at 5 percent and an
obligation for investors to keep shareholdings for at least three years.
The realignment of state-owned Chinese banks has progressed thanks
to the huge financial backing of the central Chinese government,
although the problem of how to restructure the Agricultural Bank of
China, which has been saddled with a remarkably high level of nonper-
forming loans, remains. Medium-sized banks and regional banks have
also stepped up efforts to absorb foreign capital investment. However, the
motives of the foreign investors and the Chinese government and banks
are slightly different. The former are seeking to reap the fruits that should
come with growth in the Chinese financial services market, while the lat-
ter are looking to acquire the advanced technology, financial expertise,
and experience of the investing companies, while retaining control of the
banks’ management.
The Chinese Stock Market at a Crossroads
Stock markets in China have remained in a slump since its tumble in June
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2001, which was triggered by the government’s policy of unloading its
holdings in state-owned entities. On the evening of April 29, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission released a public notice regarding
issues related to the pilot split share structure reform of listed companies.
Based on the notice, the commission began to implement the split share
structure reform, involving the conversion of non-tradable shares, such as
state-owned stocks and corporate stocks, into tradable shares.
The Chinese government learned its lesson from the unsuccessful
release of shareholdings in 2001, and so the public notice included a set of
conditions that must be met before approving a proposal to convert non-
tradable shares into tradable shares. Under one condition, major share-
holders of a listed company (entities owning non-tradable shares such as
the government and state-owned companies) are to convene an extraordi-
nary general shareholders meeting to propose a motion for converting
non-tradable shares into tradable shares. The motion will be adopted if it
receives support from at least two-thirds of shareholders participating in
the meeting, and support from at least two-thirds of holders of non-trad-
able shares participating in the meeting. Another condition is that origi-
nally non-tradable shares shall not be traded on the stock market within
12 months of the date of implementation of the plan to convert them into
tradable shares. Under this public notice, tough measures were imposed
to restrict the sale of shares by major shareholders after the reform plan is
completed, in order to address concerns by general investors over possible
drastic changes in supply-demand relationships in stock markets. Among
these measures is a rule stating that a former non-tradable shareholder
who holds more than 5 percent of the total shares of a listed company may
sell their shares, up to a maximum of 5 percent of the total shares of the
listed company within 12 months after the expiry of the one-year lock-up
period, and not more than 10 percent of total shares within 24 months. In
line with the conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable shares, for-
mer tradable shareholders are subject to preferential treatment, including
free allocation of a specified proportion of shares.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission designated four compa-
nies for the first-phase pilot reform project and 46 companies for the
second-phase pilot reform project. Based on the results of implementation
of these reform projects, the commission issued rules and regulations in
September to govern the split share structure reform of listed companies.
According to a policy unveiled under these rules, the commission’s
reforms will start being applied to companies that promptly meet certain
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conditions. Moves to reform the split share structure of listed companies
picked up momentum following the introduction of these rules and regu-
lations. By early 2006, 434 companies embarked on the reform, account-
ing for almost 40 percent of combined market capitalization of all compa-
nies traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. If reform is to continue at
the current pace, all listed companies will have completed the reform by
the end of 2006.
Securities markets initially reacted coolly to moves to reform the split
share structure for listed companies. Share prices in China continued to
fall, leaving the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in a crisis situation after
the benchmark SSE Composite Index fell below 1,000 for the first time in
eight years in early June. In response to this situation, Chinese securities
authorities declared that they would suspend the issuing of new shares for
new public offerings and capital increases for the time being. The authori-
ties also worked out a barrage of other measures, including granting com-
panies full or partial exemption from revenue-stamp duty and income tax,
and allowing companies to purchase their own shares. Following the
implementation of these measures, stock prices oscillated up and down
sharply between July and November, but after December they tended to
rise. It was said that behind the recovery were moves by qualified foreign
institutional investors (QFII) or overseas investors qualified to trade in
Chinese markets (32 foreign firms were designated as QFII as of the end
of 2005) to build up investments in renminbi-quoted “A stocks,” center-
ing on stocks of companies that completed the split share structure
reform. Yet the total investment quota allotted to QFII was worth just a
little over US$5.6 billion as of the end of the year, accounting for a mar-
ginal 4.3 percent of total market capitalization of all tradable shares. Thus,
the major players responsible for the recovery of Chinese stocks must
have been domestic Chinese capitals, which followed the lead of QFII
companies in returning to stock markets. How overall stock prices in
China will be affected when the conversion of state-owned and corporate
shares from non-tradable issues to tradable issues is completed, as
expected, is a question worthy of attention.
Moves to Reform Corporate Systems
At the 18th meeting of the Standing Committee on October 27, the
National People’s Congress passed and promulgated an amendment to the
corporate law, effective on January 1, 2006, marking the first sweeping
overhaul of the law since it was established in 1993. The revised law pro-
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vides for a substantial reduction in the minimum capital required for set-
ting up a business corporation, allows the establishment of single-person
companies, adopts the principle of general incorporation, adopts the doc-
trine of piercing the corporate veil, and introduces rules on lawsuits by
shareholders. The new corporate law is aimed at providing greater flexi-
bility in establishing a company, while improving corporate governance
systems. Along with the revision to the corporate law, the securities law
was also comprehensively revised.
On corporate reform, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the
Chinese government have adopted a two-pronged policy—promoting the
development of the private sector, and reorganizing major state-owned
enterprises. On January 12, the Standing Committee of the State Council
adopted in principle “some opinions on encouraging, supporting and guid-
ing the development of non-public economic activities such as those by
individuals and private companies,” and on February 24 it promulgated and
released the full text of the opinions. The “opinions” allow private-sector
companies to invest in all industrial sectors, excluding areas where business
activities by private companies are banned or limited by law. As a result,
private companies are now able to invest in the public-sector services,
infrastructure-related business, financial operations, military business, and
other areas that had been previously reserved for state-owned enterprises.
The “opinions” also encouraged the use of private-sector capital in the
realignment of state-owned companies and collectively owned companies.
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
of the State Council, which is in charge of supervising operations of cor-
porations under the State Council, emphasized the policy of promoting
further realignment of state-owned companies. At a meeting in September
of leaders of state-owned companies under the jurisdiction of the State
Council, Li Rongrong, chairman of the commission, unveiled a plan to
trim the number of such state-owned companies from the current 169 to
about 80–100 in the immediate future (21st Century Business Herald [21
Shiji Jingji Baodao], September 29, 2005). The State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council viewing
Tamasek Holdings, an entity affiliated with the government of Singapore,
as an ideal model, envisages eventually streamlining state-owned compa-
nies under its control into scores of corporate groups, operating mainly in
sectors vital to the national economy and national security.
The scrapping and realignment of major state-owned companies is a
reasonable policy choice in terms of increasing the efficiency of invest-
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ment of state-owned assets. But it is quite likely that such a policy will
help to strengthen market control or monopolization by a small number
of companies. Therefore, a major challenge likely to face the Chinese gov-
ernment in steering its corporate policy is how to strike a balance between
two major policy objectives—expediting competition by encouraging the
entry of private companies into formerly state-run businesses, and stream-
lining large state-owned enterprises.
Agricultural Issues and the Abolition of Agricultural Tax
In early 2005, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) released a public notice in which it stated that China would main-
tain its policy of trying to raise the income of agricultural households.
However, income growth slowed in 2005 with food supply-demand ties
softening due to a good harvest. This was in contrast to the increase in
farm household income in the preceding year, attributable to higher food
prices. In 2005, the income of urban households grew sharply, causing
the income disparity with farmers to increase to 3.22:1, the largest gap
since China adopted its reform and opening policy (21st Century Business
Herald [21 Shiji Jingji Baodao], December 1, 2005). In view of these cir-
cumstances, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of
the CPC put forward a slogan calling for the building of new socialist agri-
cultural society in the proposal on the 11th plan (refer to “Revival of
Industrial Policy?”). The proposal focuses on improving farm-related
institutional systems, through measures to boost public works projects in
agricultural districts, to promote modernization of farm businesses, and
to permit the sale of tenancy rights of farmland on secondary markets. At
a working conference on agricultural affairs at the end of the year, the
Central Committee pushed anew its slogan of promoting the building of a
new socialist agricultural society, and emphasized the policy of expanding
fiscal money supply for the prosperity of agricultural areas.
China has been abolishing agricultural tax in a phased manner since
2004 in order to alleviate the tax burden on farmers. By the end of 2005,
28 provincial governments had abolished the tax. In the three remaining
provinces of Hebei, Shandong, and Yunnan, state-designated poor prefec-
tures repealed the tax. As a result, revenues from the collection of agricul-
tural taxes plunged from 23.2 billion yuan in 2004 to about 1.5 billion
yuan in 2005, leading the central government to provide 66.4 billion yuan
in subsidies to provincial governments. However, the subsidies fell far
short of the 160–180 billion yuan, the minimum amount believed neces-
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sary for provincial governments across the nation to maintain public ser-
vices in farm areas. Therefore, the transfer of fiscal money from the cen-
tral government to provincial governments in the form of subsidies can
make up for only a marginal portion of public services in agricultural
areas (Finance [Caijing], March 7, 2005). As a result, village and town
governments and village-level committees suffered serious budget short-
falls. Following the abolition of agricultural tax, people in some farm
areas have been informally ordered to start paying for public services such
as education, health, and medical services. Another problem faced by farm
villages after the repeal of the tax is the difficulty of finding people to
work as ranking village officials, because the debt-ridden state of villages
makes potential officials reluctant to work as public servants. To compen-
sate for loss of agricultural tax, various charges are being imposed on
activities in farm areas, such as migration by farmers to other areas for
work, marriage registration, and the building of a new house.
Furthermore, many villages and town governments have continued to
levy agricultural tax even after their provincial governments declared the
repeal of such a tax (Finance [Caijing], February 6, 2006). Also attracting
media attention is the issue of debts accumulated by town and village gov-
ernments. The total debts of village and town governments across China
is said to be approximately 600 billion yuan at present. Some critics are
concerned that if unable to handle such debts appropriately, village and
town governments may use grants from the central government to finance
debt repayments.
As part of agricultural reform following the scrapping of farm tax, the
Chinese government has adopted the policy of using larger state and
provincial budgets to finance compulsory-education services in farm
areas, previously operated largely by money put up by farm households
on their own. According to a working report presented to the government
in March 2005, children and students from poor households living in
poor districts were to be exempt by the end of the year from paying
expenses for textbooks and educational materials, and other miscella-
neous expenses, and such households were to receive subsidies for
accommodation-related expenses. These measures are to expand within
three years to cover all elementary school and junior high school students
from poor farm households across the nation (Nanfang Weekly [Nanfang
Zhoumo], March 10, 2005). The Ministry of Finance of the State Council
has set up a project team to study ways to realize financial reform of com-
pulsory education services in agricultural areas. But in view of the fact
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that many municipal governments have been saddled with large debts,
there is a fear that proceeds from additional investment by the central
government for education-related financial reform may be used for debt
repayments. At the 19th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th
National People’s Congress, China formally decided to abolish an ordi-
nance on agricultural tax, effective on January 1, 2006. But whether the
abolition, an innovative step for China, will surely improve welfare of
agricultural households in the future depends largely on the progress of
financial reform and administrative-office reform. The CPC and the
Chinese government have been stepping up efforts to solve farm-related
issues. But it is clear that what is most important to increasing the income
of the agricultural populace is job creation in the urban industrial sector.
Pay for migrant workers has been rising since around 2003, when labor
supply-demand relations tightened in China, particularly in coastal indus-
trial areas.
Economic Relations between Japan and China
Trade between Japan and China has expanded, reaching US$189.4 billion
in 2005. But trade growth in the year declined from the previous year,
both in exports and imports. In particular, Japan-originated import
growth slowed substantially, falling 8.9 percent from the preceding year
in US dollar terms, due to sluggish shipments of semiconductors, produc-
tion facilities, and finished automobiles. The decline in trade was attrib-
uted to two factors—sluggish demand growth in domestic markets and
expanded production by Japanese carmakers in China. In 2005, Japan’s
trade deficit with China amounted to an all-time high of US$28.7 billion,
according to the website of the Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO). Slowing growth in exports to China and expanding trade
deficits were seen not only in Japan but also in the United States and the
EU.
Boycotts against Japanese products were called for in anti-Japanese
demonstrations staged in April. But the losses sustained by Japanese busi-
nesses because of the boycott were limited. Also, enthusiasm by Japanese
companies to invest in China has remained strong. However, if the sour-
ing in relations between Japan and China on the diplomatic and trade
fronts persists, negative economic effects are likely to emerge.
(by Kenichi Imai and Mami Yamaguchi)
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FOREIGN RELATIONS
China has pushed for diplomacy aimed at promoting multilateral cooper-
ation, by taking part in international frameworks, including the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the first East Asia Summit (EAS), as
well as six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program.  On bilateral
relations, ties with Japan have deteriorated markedly, as seen in anti-
Japanese demonstrations. On relations with the United States, China tried
to build cooperative ties through a summit between the leaders of the two
countries, and strategic dialogue, although Beijing has remained critical of
the unilateralism of the Bush Administration. In addition, China has been
promoting strategic partnerships with Russia and European countries.
Japan-China Relations Cooler than Ever
In 2005, relations between Japan and China deteriorated beyond the so-
called “cool politically, hot economically”—an expression often used to
describe the relationship between the two countries. On April 2, scores of
young Chinese broke into a Japanese-affiliated supermarket outlet in
Chengdu to protest against Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of
the UN Security Council. The assault sparked anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions across China, including an April 9 rally staged in Beijing by about
ten thousand people, during which rocks were hurled at the Japanese
Embassy. On April 16, tens of thousands of people participated in an anti-
Japanese demonstration in Shanghai, during which the Japanese consulate
was damaged by rock-throwing, and many Japanese-affiliated retail stores
were destroyed.
The Chinese government officially opposed the staging of anti-
Japanese demonstrations but continued to assert that such incidents
resulted mainly from then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s
visits to Tokyo’s war-linked Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese govern-
ment’s screening of history textbooks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
China stated on April 13 that demonstrations were voluntary actions by
Chinese citizens who were discontented with the mishandling by the
Japanese side of history issues, including the invasion of China. The min-
istry also said the Chinese government could not support the radical
actions of protesters, and it continued calling for restraint. The ministry
also said that Japan was responsible for this deterioration of Japan-China
relations and that therefore Japan should reflect on its conduct. Referring
to Japan’s bid to obtain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council,
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Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said on April 12 that only a country that
respects history and takes responsibility for it can win the confidence of
the people of Asia and the rest of the world, and play a larger role in the
international community. The Chinese side was apparently trying to
block Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security
Council by making Japan’s handling of history an international issue.
During his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing on
April 17, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura demanded that
China apologize to Japan over violence by protesters and that it provide
compensation for the damage caused to Japanese property in China. But
Chinese Foreign Minister Li did not comply with the demands. On April
23, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu
Jintao held a summit in Indonesia on the fringes of a ceremony marking
the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Asian-African Conference.
Chinese President Hu made a five-point proposal for the advancement of
Japan-China relations. Meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
asked China to show an “appropriate response” to the consequences of
anti-Japanese demonstrations, although he refrained from explicitly
demanding compensation for the damage caused by the demonstrations.
But Chinese President Hu did not offer an apology. Hu’s consideration for
the general feelings of the Chinese people was apparently behind Beijing’s
tough stance against Japan, as displayed on a series of occasions, includ-
ing the summit meeting with Koizumi. Chinese people staged anti-
Japanese rallies bearing slogans of patriotism. And education to promote
patriotic sentiments in the Chinese people was promoted by none other
than the Chinese government. The Chinese government thought that
directly criticizing anti-Japanese demonstrations would be seen as contra-
dicting its own policy toward Japan. Thus, the government initially took
the position of giving tacit approval to the moves. The government’s inac-
tion in opposing the moves resulted in continued demonstrations that
showed no signs of abating. On the other hand, moves to stage rallies
against Japan spread further via the Internet. In Shanghai, the city govern-
ment issued a preemptive warning that it would prohibit citizens from
participating in protests, but tens of thousands of people staged anti-
Japanese rallies, defying the warning.
As soon as the rally in Shanghai was staged, the Chinese government
started taking comprehensive measures to prevent the further spread of
demonstrations. Chinese authorities finally budged for political reasons—
they were concerned that forces organizing rallies might link up with
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forces dissatisfied with government policy, in relation to social contradic-
tions such as the growing disparities between rich and poor. The authori-
ties feared that these forces would become organized and initiate riots,
possibly shifting their target of criticism to the current Chinese govern-
ment and leading to calls for democratization. Thus a sense of crisis in
fear that this worst-case scenario might eventuate has persisted strongly
within the Chinese government. Anti-Japanese demonstrations receded
by the end of April due to the Chinese government’s efforts to crack down
on violent actions. But the Chinese government is believed to have been
severely damaged by the fact that demonstrations spread across the nation
via the Internet, and in Shanghai, an area of concentrated foreign invest-
ment, the local municipality had a hard time coping with demonstrators
appropriately.
China’s relations with Japan have been further strained due to the
issue of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the war-
linked Yasukuni Shrine—a long-time source of contention between the
two countries. On May 16, Prime Minister Koizumi told the Budget
Committee of Japan’s House of Representatives that he has no reasons to
stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. The remark prompted Chinese Vice
Premier Wu Yi to abruptly cancel her scheduled meeting with Koizumi in
Japan, citing urgent public duty in China. She promptly returned home,
although she did meet with Japanese business leaders. During the shrine’s
autumn-festival period on October 17, Koizumi visited the Yasukuni
Shrine, marking his fifth visit there since taking office in 2001. Following
the visit, the Chinese government notified Japan that Japanese Foreign
Minister Nobutaka Machimura’s visit to China from October 23, and his
scheduled meeting with the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister would be
postponed. In addition, China decided not to hold its leader’s meeting
with Koizumi on the fringes of the East Asia Summit. The meeting
between Koizumi and the South Korea leader on the sidelines of the East
Asian Summit was also scrapped due to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit. Chinese
Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi said on November 16 that the summit
meeting between Japan and China would not be resumed until the dispute
over the Yasukuni Shrine is resolved. But the Japanese government’s posi-
tion on the issue has remained unchanged, with each party’s argument
failing to find compromise.
Japan and China held subcabinet-level talks to solve the dispute over
natural gas development in the East China Sea in May 2005 and
September 2005, however, the talks made little progress. Defying repeated
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requests by the Japanese government for restraint, China began pumping
natural gas in the Tianwaitian field in the East China Sea in late
September. As a countermeasure, Japan has started procedures to grant
private-sector companies rights to exploit gas fields in the East China Sea.
However, digging on a trial basis has yet to begin. Meanwhile, China, in a
sign of intimidation, deployed a warship in waters near the gas field in
question. In October, the Japanese government proposed that the two
countries jointly explore natural gas on both sides of what Japan claims to
be the median line that separates the two countries’ exclusive economic
zones in the East China Sea. But China has sounded reluctant toward the
Japanese proposal. While Japan-China ties later worsened after Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine, China completed
the construction of a pipeline linking mainland China and natural gas
fields.
China’s Xinhua News Agency reported on December 20, 2005, that the
soured political relations between Japan and China due to Koizumi’s
Yasukuni visit were also hurting their economic relations. In 2005, rela-
tions between the two countries changed from “politically cool and eco-
nomically hot” to “politically cool and economically cool,” according to
the news agency. Relations have deteriorated so much that they are now
seen as entering their “coldest period” since the two countries normalized
diplomatic relations in 1972.
China’s Diplomatic Efforts to Arrange Resumption of Six-
party Talks
Six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program have effectively come to
a halt since Pyongyang declared on February 10 that it has possessed a
nuclear weapon and that it would suspend participation in the six-part
talks indefinitely. The declaration came in the wake of ongoing coordina-
tion between the United States and China to pave the way for the resump-
tion of the talks. Following the development, China, which has chaired
the multilateral conference, began to work aggressively to persuade North
Korea to return to the negotiation table. Wang Jiarui, Head of the
International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, visited
North Korea and met with General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party
Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang on February 21. Wang presented to Kim Jong Il
a message from CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao saying that resolving the
issue of North Korea’s nuclear program through six-party talks would
serve the fundamental interests of both China and North Korea. Kim Jong
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Il told Wang that North Korea would not withdraw from the framework
of the multilateral talks and is prepared to return to the talks if conditions
are met. During the Kim-Wang meeting, the Chinese side is believed to
have expressed its readiness to substantially increase oil supplies to North
Korea—after shipments were cut sharply following Pyongyang’s nuclear
weapon declaration—if the North returned to the six-party negotiations.
On March 23, CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao held talks with visiting
North Korean Deputy Premier Pak Pong Ju in China, and confirmed the
friendly relationship between China and North Korea. Hu then told Pak
that Beijing is ready to play a constructive role in making the Korean
Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
The US government has placed high expectations on China, North
Korea’s closest ally and strongest supporter, to play a role in helping
resume six-party nuclear talks. These expectations were highlighted dur-
ing two of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visits to China, in talks
with Chinese leaders regarding the resumption of the multilateral talks.
During the bilateral summit held in September and November, between
which six-party talks took place, the US and Chinese leaders agreed that
the two countries would strive to make North Korea dismantle nuclear
weapons through the framework of six-party talks. The United States
asked China to use its influence on North Korea, including the threat of
economic sanctions, as much as possible, to realize the resumption of the
six-way talks. But China’s policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue
was believed to be slightly different from the policy by the United States.
Christopher Hill, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs, for example, who had visited Beijing in late April, proposed that
China, which has provided oil to North Korea through a pipeline, impose a
total embargo on such supply as a means of making the North return to the
talks (Washington Post, May 7, 2005). But the Chinese side rejected the
proposal, saying a pipeline being used to supply oil to North Korea would
be clogged with hardened oil components if the oil supply were stopped.
Instead, as a counterproposal, China told the United States that it was con-
sidering expanding the scope of food items subject to a trade embargo
against North Korea, saying that the suspension of food aid would be more
effective in helping the North to return to six-party talks.
Thanks to informal negotiations between the United States and North
Korea for the resumption of six-party talks, Pyongyang agreed with the
United States in early July to return to the talks. Following the agreement,
the fourth round of six-party talks were held from July 26. On September
People’s Republic of China | 125
19, the six countries issued a joint statement, their first such statement.
The six-point statement committed North Korea to fully scrapping its
nuclear weapons, return promptly to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
and accept inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). On November 9, the fifth round of six-party talks
started. But the talks went into recess with the six countries agreeing to
get together again early next year.
The fourth round of talks was held amid speculation that the United
States would refer North Korea’s nuclear issue to discussion at the UN
Security Council if the framework of the multilateral talks collapsed. But
the fourth-round talks produced tangible results, as they ended in the
release of the first joint statement. This successful result was mainly
attributed to the diplomatic role played by China, which wanted to avoid
taking tough measures against North Korea. Before and after the six-party
talks were held, the Chinese government sent key officials one after
another to North Korea. For example, on July 12, just two weeks before
the fourth round of six-party talks started, State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan
visited North Korea. On October 8, a month before the start of the five-
round talks, a period when the fate of that round was imperiled, Vice
Premier Wu Yi visited North Korea. In addition, CPC General Secretary
Hu Jintao visited Pyongyang on October 26 and held talks with North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il. During the summit, Kim Jong Il told Hu that
North Korea would participate in the fifth round of six-party talks as
scheduled, in line with his country’s earlier pledge. During the summit,
the leaders of China and North Korea also signed a bilateral economic and
technological cooperation agreement.
US-China Relations in 2005
Relations between the United States and China in 2005 were remembered
as a mix of confrontation and cooperation. US government officials,
including Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, recently proposed
that China become “a responsible stakeholder” in the international com-
munity. The proposal reflected the United States’ expectations of China,
as a responsible major power, to engage actively in international efforts to
maintain global order in view of the country’s booming economic growth.
As if responding to the US proposal for China to become “a responsible
stakeholder,” some in China have recently asserted that the country
should focus on realizing “peaceful development.” As shown in a white
paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” released by the State
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Council in December 2005, “peaceful development” is a concept floated
by the administration of President Hu Jintao to prevent the spread of the
idea that China is a threat to the world, by clarifying the country’s role in
the international community. The concept intends that China, as a major
power, participate actively in global efforts to maintain international
order, by pursuing “peaceful development” and promoting stability of
China and its surrounds. The multilateral-oriented cooperative diplomacy
pursued by China in recent years has been in line with its policy of pro-
moting “peaceful development.”
Although China has adopted a policy of “peaceful development,” it
does not mean that a solid consensus on the idea has formed in the coun-
try. Some hard-liners in China have branded the “peaceful development”
policy as “weak-kneed.” In July 2005, for example, Zhu Chenghu, dean of
the Defense Affairs Institute of the PLA National Defense University,
stated that, “If the Americans train their missiles and position-guided
munitions on to targets in Chinese territory, I think we will have to
respond with nuclear weapons.... We will prepare ourselves for the
destruction of all of the cities east of Xi’an. Of course the Americans will
have to be prepared for the destruction of hundreds of cities by the
Chinese” (Financial Times, July 15, 2005). The Chinese government
quickly distanced itself from Zhu’s statement, with Foreign Affairs
Minister Li Zhaoxing saying Zhu’s remarks are his personal views and do
not represent the position of the Chinese government. Li also said China’s
“no-first-use” policy regarding nuclear weapons could not be changed.
How the Hu Jintao administration would push for the “peaceful develop-
ment” policy while curbing moves by hard-liners like Zhu deserves care-
ful attention.
China has remained very distrustful over the Japan-US security
alliance. On February 19, defense and foreign affairs leaders of Japan and
the United States met in Washington for the “2 plus 2” security talks and
reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-US alliance, in which the security-
alliance system is seen as a core of the bilateral alliance. A joint statement
issued after the security talks included an agreement by Japan and the
United States to seek peaceful solutions to issues related to the Taiwan
Straits, through promotion of dialogue. The agreement was one of com-
mon strategic objectives in the region agreed on by the two countries.
China severely criticized the agreement between Japan and the United
States as “absolutely unacceptable,” terming it as boldly challenging
China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security, and as
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encouraging forces in favor of Taiwan’s independence to take dangerous
chances by sending a wrong signal to these forces (People’s Daily,
February 21, 2005). As seen in agenda items at the “2 plus 2” security
talks held in February and October, Japan and the United States have
recently stepped up efforts to jointly develop a missile defense (MD) sys-
tem and to realign US forces stationed in Japan. China is likely to
strengthen its vigilance against such moves.
The United States explicitly voiced concerns over China’s moves to
build its military capability in the 2005 Annual Report on the Military
Power of the People ’s Republic of China, released by the Defense
Department in July. The report stated that China’s military spending in
2005 was estimated at a maximum US$90 billion—two to three times
higher than the US$29.9 billion the Chinese government officially
reported. In the report, the Pentagon expressed concerns over the opaque
nature of China’s military capability and judged China’s rapid military
modernization could pose a clear threat to US forces stationed in the
neighborhood of China. The annual report also stated the Chinese mili-
tary has deployed 650 to 730 short-range ballistic missiles on the coast
facing the Taiwan Straits, increasing the deployment of such missiles at
the rate of 100 per year. The Chinese government protested strongly
against the US perceptions expressed in the 2005 Pentagon report on
China’s military power, and embarked on dispelling views that China is a
threat. In September, the Chinese government released a white paper enti-
tled, China ’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation, to elaborate on the Chinese government’s policies on arms
control and disarmament. In the white paper, China emphasized that its
military power is limited to the minimum level required for the protection
of the country, and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been
sharply reducing the number of its forces. At the end of the year, the PLA
announced that it had completed a plan to cut 200,000 forces. In addition,
China invited military officers from 24 countries, including the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Australia, to China to
observe a military exercise called North Sword 2005. The invitation is
seen as part of Beijing’s efforts to demonstrate to the rest of the world that
China’s military capability has been transparent.
Behind US concern over China’s military buildup has been the Taiwan
issue. The United States has expressed concern over the possibility of
China using military power against Taiwan. On March 14, the National
People’s Congress formally adopted the Anti-Secession Law, which stipu-
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lates that mainland China oppose and suppress secessionist moves by
forces in favor of Taiwan’s independence. But the following day, on March
15, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution against the Anti-
Secession Law by an overwhelming majority. When US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice visited China, she expressed a critical view toward the
Anti-Secession Law, telling the Chinese leadership on March 21 that the
United States does not welcome China’s enactment of the Anti-Secession
Law because it is likely to intensify tensions between China and Taiwan
(refer to “Domestic Politics”).
Another reason why Washington is concerned about China’s military
buildup is related to moves by the EU to lift an embargo on arms exports
to China. In recent years, China has launched diplomatic offense against
the EU in a bid to make it lift the trade embargo. The United States has
been adamantly opposed to the EU removing the embargo, arguing the
lifting of the measure would lead to a change in the military balance in the
region. In February, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution
calling for the EU to review a plan to lift a China-bound arms embargo.
Wariness over China mounted in Europe following the March enactment
of the Anti-Secession Law, leading the EU to postpone the lifting of the
trade embargo against China to next year or later from the originally
planned June 2005 (New York Times, March 23, 2005). However, after
their summit in September, China and the EU released a joint statement
to the effect that they would continue discussions on the arms-trade issue.
In addition, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Europe in October, lob-
bying for EU leaders to lift the embargo at an early date and deepening
trade ties between China and the EU.
As mentioned above, the United States and China, despite several
pending issues, tried to strengthen their diplomatic relations via meetings
of their leaders. On September 13, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the
United States for the first time since taking office. The trip was returned
by US President George W. Bush’s visit to Beijing on November 19. In
August and December, the United States and China also held regular sub-
cabinet-level meetings for comprehensive strategic dialogue covering
political, economic, security, and international issues, marking the first
such talks between the two countries.
China-Russia Relations through Bilateral and Multilateral
Cooperation
During their summit meeting on November 18, the leaders of China and
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Russia shared the view that 2005 can be remembered as a year of success-
ful relations between the two countries. Throughout the year, the two
countries worked to deepen their diplomatic ties through the promotion
of bilateral and multilateral interchanges. On June 30, Chinese President
Hu Jintao visited Russia and held a summit with Russian President
Vladimir Putin. At the summit, the leaders of the two countries signed an
agreement on the eastern border, declaring the longstanding border dis-
pute solved. Following the summit, China and Russia also signed the
Joint Declaration on the International Order in the 21st Century. Under
the declaration, the two countries agreed that the basic foundation for
maintaining international order should be built on multilateralism,
equally beneficial relations, and a UN-led initiative, and they pledged to
oppose the use of arbitrary unilateralism as a means of dealing with
international issues. The declaration thus indirectly criticized the US
administration of President George W. Bush for his unilateral approach to
international issues.
On July 5, the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) held their fifth summit in Kazakhstan. India, Pakistan, Iran, and
Mongolia attended the SCO summit as observers, joining the grouping’s
six regular members—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The participants discussed measures against
international terrorism, expansion of economic cooperation in energy
resources development and other areas, and promotion of human inter-
changes on various fronts. A declaration issued by the leaders after their
summit meeting demanded the withdrawal of US forces stationed in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, although it refrained from specifying the
names of the countries, saying that, “Considering the completion of the
active military stage of antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan, the mem-
ber states of the SOC consider it necessary that the respective members of
the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of
objects of infrastructure and the presence of their military contingents on
the territories of SCO member states.”
In August, China and Russia conducted their first joint military exer-
cise, dubbed “Peace Mission 2005.” The exercise was carried out over
eight days from August 18, in Vladivostok in far eastern Russia, China’s
Shandong Peninsula, and nearby offshore seawaters. The exercises
involved about ten thousand troops from the armies, navies, and air forces
of Chinese and Russian armed forces, with about eight thousand troops
from the Chinese side taking part. China and Russia invited senior
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defense officials from India and Pakistan, as well as representatives of
member countries of the SCO, to observe the joint exercise. The exercises
included a training drill apparently based on the assumption of an emer-
gency breaking out in Taiwan. This spawned speculation that China tried
to test an agreement between Japan and the United States made in
February 2005, in which the Taiwan issue was identified as a common
strategic objective. As expected, China and Russia brushed off such spec-
ulation, expressing their official position that the joint exercise was meant
to enhance the capability of the armed forces of the two countries in strik-
ing international terrorism and separatism, and that it was not carried out
against any third country or imagined enemy. But the joint military exer-
cise still drew attention as a move to counter the unilateralism by the
United States and its new military strategy involving the realignment of
forces stationed outside the mainland United States.
Russia is a country that could be beneficial to China because its abun-
dant oil and natural gas resources make it a potential long-term energy
supplier to China, and also because it is capable of expanding advanced
arms exports to the Asian country at a time when the European Union’s
plan to lift an arms embargo against China has made little progress. It is
true that a honeymoon period was seen in 2005 between China and
Russia. But in light of their past historical relations, it is difficult to deter-
mine immediately the extent to which they will unite strategically.
First East Asia Summit and Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast
Asia
China has continued to focus on reinforcing its relations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through a multilateral
cooperative framework in the Asia-Pacific region. On December 14, the
first East Asia Summit was held in Malaysia. The summit has been seen as
the touchstone of Asia’s ability to work out the direction of the proposed
East Asian Community. China asserted that members of an East Asia
Summit should be selected from the framework of ASEAN Plus Three
countries (Japan, China, and South Korea). China also made it clear to
other Asian countries that it does not want the United States to participate
in the summit (Newsweek, September 26, 2005). It has been suggested
that, in pushing for the formation of the East Asian Community, China is
trying to check the unilateralism of the United States. It was finally
decided that the summit would involve 13 countries (ASEAN plus Japan,
China, and South Korea), and three others—India, Australia, and New
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Zealand. At the first East Asia Summit in Malaysia, the leaders of the
member nations released a joint declaration, reaffirming their commit-
ment to promoting regional cooperation in political, economic, security,
and other fields. The leaders also agreed in the declaration that an East
Asia Summit should play an important role for the promotion of regional
integration in Asia, with an eye to the formation of an East Asian
Community in the future. In view of the divergent strategies being consid-
ered by ASEAN countries to becoming a leading player in regional multi-
lateral talks, political bargaining between major powers over the proposed
East Asian Community is expected to continue for some time.
(by Haruka Matsumoto)
ISSUES IN 2006
An important political task for the administration of President Hu Jintao
is to comprehensively solidify its power base in preparation for the 17th
party convention set for the autumn of 2007. In preparing for the launch
of such a move, the Hu administration is likely to reshuffle high-level offi-
cials of the PLA and regional cadres. The extent to which politicians hail-
ing from the Communist Youth League of China—from which Hu himself
rose—are chosen for important posts will serve as a barometer for how
strong Hu’s power base has become. In 2006, Hu is likely to continue an
education campaign to help strengthen discipline within the party.
However, such a campaign is expected to draw a strong reaction from
regional officials, thereby forcing Hu to busy himself in handling the mat-
ter. In a bid to make its power base more solid, the Hu administration is
expected to strengthen its control over the media and intellectuals by lim-
iting freedom of speech, making the advancement of political reforms dif-
ficult in China.
On bilateral diplomacy, it is imperative for the Hu administration to
mend its soured ties with Japan. The election of the next Japanese prime
minister in the autumn of 2006 will be a key factor in improving Japan-
China relations. China is facing the task of revising its policy toward
Japan, with consideration given to who will succeed Junichiro Koizumi as
new Japanese prime minister. Relations between China and the United
States are likely to continue oscillating between confrontation and coop-
eration. The question of whether regular subcabinet-level meetings
between China and the United States can serve as a stable framework for
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constructive discussions is under discussion. On multilateral cooperative
diplomacy, China would have to appreciate that the United States cannot
devote itself to six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs in view
of the confusion over the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. Under these cir-
cumstances, China’s role in the six-party talks is likely to grow further. It
is also worth paying attention to moves by the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), of which China is a member, and the proposed cre-
ation of an East Asian Community.
Investment-led growth efforts in China in recent years have produced
a huge supply capacity in the country. As already widely perceived, it is
indispensable for China to shift its growth policy toward consumption-
oriented demand if it wants to stably sustain high growth while avoiding
further intensification of trade frictions stemming from its excessive
reliance on external demand. The most important factor for achieving
such growth is increasing the purchasing power of consumers, by pro-
moting the transfer of labor from farm areas to urban areas.
As its international presence grows, China will continue to face trade
frictions with foreign countries, especially industrialized countries. Given
these circumstances, China is likely to encounter international pressure to
implement a phased expansion of the fluctuation range of the renminbi’s
exchange rate against the US dollar, which is currently set at a very mod-
erate level.
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IMPORTANT DATES IN 2005
January
1: Attending a New Year tea party sponsored by the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, Hu Jintao, general secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party, expressed the hope that mainland China and
Taiwan will soon resume interchanges.
- Premier Wen Jiabao visited the Tongchuan Mining Administration of
Shaanxi Province and consoled the bereaved families of miners killed in a
mine accident on November 28, 2004.
3: Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the Taiwanese Strait Exchange Foundation,
died. Wang Daohan, president of the Association for Relations across the
Taiwan Straits, sent a telegram of condolences to his family.
5: The Chinese Communist Party held a working conference on the educa-
tion campaign to preserve the advanced nature of party members. Zeng
Qinghong, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the
CPC Central Committee, delivered an important speech to the conference.
5–6: Premier Wen Jiabao visited Indonesia. The premier attended an emergency
meeting of ASEAN leaders to help reconstruct the regions of Indonesia hit
by the massive earthquake and subsequent tsunami in late 2004.
10–11: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection opened. General Secretary Hu Jintao delivered an important
speech to the session.
14: An expert panel met to present a report on “a new-era education campaign
to preserve the advanced nature of party members.” CPC General
Secretary Hu Jintao presented an important report.
17: Former CPC general secretary Zhao Ziyang died aged 85. Jia Qinglin,
chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,
attended his funeral ceremony, held on the 29th.
20: China established diplomatic relations with Grenada.
23: The Fujian Provincial People’s Congress elected Huang Xiaojing as gover-
nor of Fujian Province.
29: Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference, delivered a speech at a meeting commemorating the 10th
anniversary of the speech made by Jiang Zemin on China’s unification.
- The Jilin Provincial People’s Congress elected Wang Min as governor of
Jilin Province.
- China’s first charter flight of the Lunar New Year arrived in Taipei
(through February 20).
30: The State Council released Document No. 1 of the Central Committee in
2005, presenting some policy proposals to improve the overall production
capacity of the agricultural sector.
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February
1–2: Sun Yafu, vice president of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan
Straits, visited Taipei to express his condolences over the death of Koo
Chen-fu, chairman of the Taiwanese Strait Exchange Foundation.
14: More than 200 people were killed due to a gas explosion at the Sunjiawan
coal mine in Liaoning Province. The colliery is operated by the Fuxin
Mining Group.
19: CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao delivered an important speech on the
building of a harmonious socialist society at a meeting of the CPC Central
Party School.
- Wang Jiarui, head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC
Central Committee, visited North Korea (through the 22nd). Wang met
with General Secretary Kim Jong Il and conveyed China’s hope that North
Korea will return to six-party talks as soon as possible.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its opposition to part of a
Japan-US joint security statement covering the Taiwan issue, released fol-
lowing a “2 plus 2” security talks of the defense and foreign affairs heads of
Japan and the United States.
24: The State Council released the full text of its opinions on encouraging
nonpublic economic activities and guidance on such activities.
25: Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing attended a meeting of SCO foreign
ministers in Kazakhstan.
March
3–12: The 10th National Committee of the Chinese People ’s Political
Consultative Conference opened its third meeting.
4: CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao put forward “four opinions” on relations
across the Taiwan Straits.
5–14: The 10th National People’s Congress opened its third meeting. On the
13th, Hu Jintao was named chairman of the CPC Central Military
Commission. Hu delivered an important speech at a meeting of represen-
tatives of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On the 14th, the Anti-
Secession Law was enacted.
10: Tung Chee Hwa submitted his resignation as chief executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. The plenary session of the State
Council endorsed his resignation and Donald Tsang, administrative secre-
tary, was appointed acting chief executive on the 12nd.
17: Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura said Japan would discon-
tinue yen loans to China in 2008.
20–21: US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited China.
22–27: North Korean Premier Pak Pong Ju visited China.
24–27: Japanese Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya visited China. Japan and
China held the sixth expert-level talks on security issues.
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28–April 1: Chiang Pin-kung, vice chairman of Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT), vis-
ited China. He met with Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference.
30: The Standing Committee of the State Council approved the outline of
2005 activities of the State Council and the council’s opinion on deepening
China’s economic reforms in 2005.
April
2: Anti-Japanese demonstrations were staged in Chengdu City. Japanese-
affiliated stores were attacked.
5: The Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry filed a request about Japan’s history
textbook screening with the Japanese Embassy in Beijing.
5–12: Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India. On
the 11th, Wen met with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
signed a pact on China-India border issues.
8: The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets released a unified stock index.
9: An anti-Japanese rally involving about ten thousand people was staged in
Beijing.
13: The Japanese government initiated procedures to grant private companies
rights to dig natural gas fields on a trial basis in the East China Sea.
15: The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee received a report from
a democratic-life group for advanced education activities, with Standing
Committee members attending.
- China released its official 2004 gazette on national land resources.
16: An anti-Japanese rally was staged in Shanghai with several tens of thou-
sands of people participating.
16–18 Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura visited China. He held
talks with Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing and State
Councillor Tang Jiaxuan to deal with anti-Japanese demonstrations in
China.
18–19: Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited China.
19: A meeting was held to discuss the situation on Japan-China relations.
Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing presented a report on such relations
to the meeting. China began efforts to prevent the further spread of anti-
Japanese demonstrations.
20–28: President Hu Jintao visited Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
21: The Information Office of the State Council released a white paper on new
developments regarding the protection of intellectual property rights in
China.
- The Ministry of Public Security released a statement to restrict anti-
Japanese demonstrations.
23: President Hu Jintao met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.
During the meeting, Hu put forward a five-point proposal for the advance-
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ment of Japan-China relations.
24: President Hu Jintao attended a ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of
the foundation of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia.
26: The Ministry of Commerce criticized the EU for floating the possibility of
invoking safeguards against textile imports from China.
26–May 3: Lien Chan, chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan, com-
monly known as Kuomintang (KMT), visited Beijing. He held talks with
CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao on the 29th.
27: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress dismissed
Health Minister Wu Yi. Gao Qiang was appointed to replace Wu.
May
5–13: James Soong, chairman of Taiwan’s People First Party, visited Beijing. He
held talks with CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao on the 12nd.
5: President Hu Jintao held phone talks with US President George W. Bush.
6–7: Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Kyoto, Japan. Li attended a
meeting of ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China, and South Korea) foreign
ministers, and a meeting of ASEM foreign ministers. On the 7th, Li met
with Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura.
8–9: President Hu Jintao visited Russia. Hu attended a ceremony marking the
60th anniversary of Russia’s victory in the war of defending the country.
16: Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi told the Budget Committee of
the House of Representatives that he has no reason to stop visiting the
Yasukuni Shirine.
- Premier Wen Jiabao met with members of a delegation sent by the
American Chamber of Commerce.
17–23: Vice Premier Wu Yi visited Japan. On the 23rd, she abruptly canceled a
scheduled meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and
returned to China, citing an emergency public duty in her country.
20: The State Council granted a hike in export duties for textile products,
effective June 1.
21–23: Tsutomu Takebe, secretary general of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), and Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, secretary general of New Komeito, visited
China. They held talks with President Hu Jintao.
27–28: A national working conference on ethnic minorities was held. President
Hu Jintao delivered an important speech.
30: Japan and China held their second bureau-chief talks in Beijing over issues
related to natural gas development in the East China Sea.
June
1: The Tariff Regulations Committee withdrew export duties on 81 textile
items.
1–3: Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Russia.
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1–4: US Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez visited Beijing. He held talks
with Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai over the textile trade dispute.
4: Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing attended a meeting of SCO foreign
ministers.
6: A national working conference on the reform of agricultural tax was held.
7: The Chinese government released documents concerning China’s views on
the reform of the United Nations.
11: A riot broke out in Dingzhou City, Hebei Province. An armed group
attacked 200 to 300 villagers, leaving six of them dead.
- A meeting of trade ministers between China and the United States was
held in Beijing.
- A China-EU dispute over textile trade was settled with the EU withdraw-
ing a plan to invoke safeguard measures, following China’s decision to
limit textile exports on a voluntary basis.
16: The election of a new chief executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region was held. Donald Tsang was acclaimed the winner
without a vote, as he was the only eligible candidate. The plenary session
of the State Council finalized his election as chief executive.
17: Bank of America agreed to acquire an equity stake in China Construction
Bank.
19: The China Securities Regulatory Commission announced that 42 compa-
nies would be subject to second-tier reforms on a trial basis, as part of
efforts to promote the secondary sale of listed firms.
19–23: South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hae Chan visited Beijing.
30–July 2: Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra visited Beijing.
30–July 3: President Hu Jintao visited Russia. He met with Russian President
Vladimir Putin and signed a joint declaration.
July
1: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress named Wu
Aiying as minister of justice and Tian Chengping as minister of labor and
social security.
- The CPC Central Committee decided to appoint Zhang Baoshun as secre-
tary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee.
3: President Hu Jintao visited Kazakhstan (through the 6th). He attended the
Fifth SCO summit.
- The second summit of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic
Cooperation Program was held. Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a speech at
an opening ceremony for the summit.
6–7: President Hu Jintao visited the United Kingdom. He attended the summit
of the G-8 powers in Gleneagles.
9: The Shanxi Provincial People’s Congress named Yu Youjun as acting gov-
ernor of the Shanxi Provincial People’s Government.
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9–10: US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Beijing.
12–14: State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan visited North Korea. He held talks with
General Secretary Kim Jong Il.
21: The People’s Bank of China announced the adoption of a new currency
system for the renminbi that makes use of a basket of currencies as a refer-
ence for exchange rate. It also revalued the Chinese currency by 2.1 per-
cent against the US dollar.
26: The Fourth six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs were held
(through August 7: The meeting went into recess).
August
1: The Sichuan Provincial Health Bureau released details of the damage
caused by a swine virus infection that affected a southwest province.
1–2: China and the United States opened their first regular subcabinet-level
meetings.
15: The State Council released some opinions on the promotion of the distrib-
ution industry.
18–25: China and Russia conducted a joint military exercise, called “Peace
Mission 2005.”
19–24: Zeng Qinghong, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of
CPC Central Committee, visited the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
September
1: A meeting celebrating the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the
Tibet Autonomous Region was held. Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, delivered an important speech
at the meeting.
- The Information Office of the State Council released a white paper enti-
tled “China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation.”
3: A meeting commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Chinese people’s
victory in the Anti-Japanese War was held. CPC General Secretary Hu
Jintao delivered an important speech.
5: China concluded a new agreement with the EU over its textile exports to
the EU.
9: President Hu Jintao visited the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
- Zeng Qinghong, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of
CPC Central Committee, visited Hong Kong (through September 12). He
attended an opening ceremony for Hong Kong Disneyland.
13: President Hu Jintao met with US President George W. Bush. Hu expressed
sympathy over the victims of the devastating hurricane that had recently
hit the United States.
13–19: The fourth six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program were
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resumed. The talks ended with the six countries releasing a joint state-
ment.
14: President Hu Jintao delivered an important speech at a summit meeting
held to mark the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations.
He met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh.
20: The Japanese government filed a protest against China over its start of nat-
ural gas pumping in the Tianwaitian field in the East China Sea.
27: China conducted a military exercise, called “North Sword 2005.”
29: The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee convened a meeting
and discussed its activities during and after the Fourth Plenary Session of
the 16th Central Committee, as well as the 11th Five-Year Long-Term
Plan.
30: Japan and China held their third subcabinet-level talks in Tokyo, over nat-
ural gas development in the East China Sea.
October
1: A meeting celebrating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was held.
8–11: The 16th Central Committee of the CPC kicked off its Fifth Plenary
Session. The session adopted a CPC Central Committee proposal on the
11th Five-Year Long-Term Plan.
- Deputy Premier Wu Yi visited North Korea. She held talks with General
Secretary Kim Jong Il.
11–15: US Treasury Secretary John Snow visited Beijing.
12: China successfully launched Shenzhou 6, marking the nation’s second
manned spacecraft flight.
15–16: The seventh meeting of the G-20 finance ministers and central bank gover-
nors opened. General Secretary Hu Jintao delivered an important speech at
the meeting.
17: Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine,
prompting China to cancel its scheduled foreign ministerial meeting with
Japan.
18–20: US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Beijing.
19: The Information Office of the State Council released a white paper on the
construction of a democratic political system in China.
25: A ceremony celebrating the 60th anniversary of Taiwan’s retrocession was
held in Beijing. Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference, delivered an important speech at the ceremony.
26–27: Premier Wen Jiabao visited Russia. He attended the fourth meeting of
prime ministers of SCO member countries.
26–30: CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao visited North Korea. He held talks with
General Secretary Kim Jong Il.
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31–November 1: President Hu Jintao visited Vietnam. He signed an agreement
between China and Vietnam to develop oil in the Gulf of Tonkin.
November
1: China and Russia held their ninth regular meeting of prime ministers.
3: China and Russia held their 10th regular meeting of prime ministers.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov
attended the meeting.
8: President Hu Jintao visited the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain
(through the 15th).
- The governments of the United States and China reached a comprehen-
sive agreement on textile trade.
9: The fifth six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs were held
(The talks went into recess on November 11).
18: Round-table talks were held in Beijing to commemorate the 90th anniver-
sary of the birth of comrade Hu Yaobang, with Premier Wen Jiabao attend-
ing. Zeng Qinghong, a Standing Committee member of the Political
Bureau of CPC Central Committee, delivered an important speech at the
talks.
- The commercial airline industries of mainland China and Taiwan
reached an agreement to operate charter flights at Chinese New Year.
18–19: President Hu Jintao visited South Korea. Hu attended the 13th APEC
informal summit in Pusan. He signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with
Chile. He held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
19–21: US President George W. Bush visited Beijing. Bush held talks with
President Hu Jintao. Meeting with Bush, Hu put forward a five-point pro-
posal to advance relations between China and the United States.
21: The government of Harbin City announced the suspension of water supply
in the city, following the contamination of the Songhua River by chemicals
due to an explosion at a chemical plant in Jilin Province. Premier Wen
Jiabao visited Harbin City to inspect the situation relating to the river con-
tamination. On December 2, the State Council dismissed Xie Zhenhua,
director of the state administration of environmental protection. Zhou
Shengxian was appointed to replace Xie.
27: The Central Committee of the CPC appointed Zhang Qingli as acting sec-
retary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Committee.
28: President Hu Jintao held talks with Mongolian President Nambaryn
Enkhbayar.
29–December 1: A central working conference on economic issues opened.
December
1: The Chinese and Indian navies conducted their first joint military exercise
in the Indian Ocean.
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4–15: Premier Wen Jiabao visited France, Slovakia, Czech, Portugal, and
Malaysia.
6: Armed police clashed with protesters opposing the construction of a
power plant in Donghua, Shanwei City, Guangdong Province.
7–8: China and the United States opened their second regular subcabinet-level
meetings.
9: Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing attended the second meeting of for-
eign ministers of ASEAN and China.
10: Foreign Affairs Minister Li Zhaoxing attended a meeting of foreign minis-
ters being held on the fringes of the first East Asia Summit.
12: A summit of ASEAN Plus Three was held.
14: Premier Wen Jiabao attended the first East Asia Summit.
20: The State Statistics Bureau announced the preliminary results of the first
economic census. The bureau revised 2004 GDP upward by 16.8 percent
from its initial estimate.
22: The Information Office of the State Council released a white paper entitled
“China’s Peaceful Development Road.”
24: The Central Committee of the CPC appointed Qian Yunlu as secretary of
the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee, Shi Zongyuan as secretary of the
Guizhou Provincial Committee, Zhang Chunxian as Secretary of the
Hunan Provincial Committee, and Wang Yang as Secretary of the
Chongqing Municipal Committee.
- Wang Daohan, president of the Association for Relations across the
Taiwan Straits, died.
28–29: A central working conference on agricultural villages opened.
29: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted a pro-
posal to repeal an ordinance on agricultural taxes. Li Shenglin was
appointed communications minister.
31: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) completed a plan to slash the number
of its troops by 200,000.
142 | REVIEW BY COUNTRY / REGION
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
 6
.1
. S
T
A
T
E
 O
R
G
A
N
IZ
A
T
IO
N
 C
H
A
R
T
People’s Republic of China | 143
Co
m
m
un
ist
 P
ar
ty
of
 C
hi
na
 (C
PC
) 
Pa
rty
 C
on
gr
es
s
Ce
nt
ra
l C
om
m
itt
ee
Ce
nt
ra
l
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
fo
r D
isc
ip
lin
e
In
sp
ec
tio
n
CP
C 
Ce
nt
ra
l
M
ilit
ar
y
Co
m
m
iss
io
n
PR
C
Ce
nt
ra
l
M
ilit
ar
y
 S
ta
te
 C
ou
nc
il
M
in
ist
rie
s
an
d
Co
m
m
iss
io
ns
Su
pr
em
e
Pe
op
le
’s
Co
ur
t
Su
pr
em
e
Pe
op
le
’s
Pr
oc
ur
at
or
at
e 
Co
m
m
an
d 
of
M
ajo
r M
ilit
ar
y
Re
gi
on
s
Lo
ca
l
Pe
op
le
’s 
Go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
St
at
e
Ad
m
ini
str
ati
on
s, 
O
ffi
ce
s a
nd
Co
m
m
itt
ee
s
Lo
ca
l H
ig
he
r
Pe
op
le
’s
Co
ur
ts
Pr
ov
in
cia
l
Pe
op
le
’s
Co
ng
re
ss
es
Lo
ca
l
Pe
op
le
’s
Pr
oc
ur
at
or
at
es
Ge
ne
ra
l S
ta
ff 
He
ad
qu
ar
te
rs
PL
A 
Na
vy
PL
A 
Ai
r F
or
ce
PL
A 
Se
co
nd
Ar
til
le
ry
 C
or
ps
Pe
op
le
’s 
Lib
er
at
io
n 
Ar
m
y
Ge
ne
ra
l P
ol
itic
al 
De
pa
rtm
en
t
Ge
ne
ra
l L
og
ist
ics
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
tS
ta
nd
in
g 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Na
tio
na
l P
eo
pl
e’
s C
on
gr
es
s
St
an
di
ng
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Ge
ne
ra
l
Se
cr
et
ar
y
Ch
in
es
e 
Pe
op
le
’s
Po
lit
ica
l
Co
ns
ul
ta
tiv
e
Co
nf
er
en
ce
 
St
an
di
ng
 C
om
m
itt
ee
Ch
in
es
e 
Pe
op
le
’s
Po
lit
ica
l
Co
ns
ul
ta
tiv
e
Co
nf
er
en
ce
Lo
ca
l C
om
m
itt
ee
s
Sp
ec
ial
 C
om
m
itt
ee
s
Ge
ne
ra
l A
rm
am
en
t
St
an
di
ng
Co
m
m
itt
ee
Pr
es
id
en
t
Ce
nt
ra
l C
om
m
itt
ee
Po
lit
ica
l B
ur
ea
u
Ce
nt
ra
l C
om
m
itt
ee
Se
cr
et
ar
iat
Lo
ca
l P
ar
ty
 C
om
m
itt
ee
s
APPENDIX 6.2 LIST OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA (CPC) LEADERS AND STATE LEADERS 
(as of end of 2005)
1. COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (CPC)
(1) Sixteenth Central Committee
General Secretary: Hu Jintao
Standing Committee Members of Central Committee Political
Bureau: Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng
Qinghong, Huang ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, Luo Gan
Members of Central Committee Political Bureau: Wang Lequan, Wang
Zhaoguo, Hui Liangyu, Liu Qi, Liu Yunshan, Li Changchun, Wu Yi, Wu
Bangguo, Wu Guanzheng, Zhang Lichang, Zhang Dejiang, Chen
Liangyu, Luo Gan, Zhou Yongkang, Hu Jintao, Yu Zhengsheng, He
Guoqiang, Jia Qinglin, Guo Boxiong, Huang ju, Cao Gangchuan, Zeng
Qinghong, Zeng Peiyan, Wen Jiabao
Central Committee Political Bureau Alternate Members: Wang Gang
Members of Secretariat of Central Committee: Zeng Qinghong, Liu
Yunshan, Zhou Yongkang, He Guoqiang, Wang Gang, Xu Caihou, He
Yong
(2) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Secretary: Wu Guanzheng
Deputy Secretaries: He Yong, Xia Zanzhong, Li Zhilun, Zhang Shutian,
Liu Xirong, Zhang Huixin, Liu Fengyan
(3) Central Military Commission
Chairman: Hu Jintao
Vice Chairmen: Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caihou
Members: Liang Guanglie, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong, Chen Bingde, Qiao
Qingchen, Zhang Dingfa, Jing Zhiyuan
(4) Organs under Central Committee
Director of Central General Office: Wang Gang
Head of Central Organization Department: He Guoqiang
Head of Central Publicity Department: Liu Yunshan
Head of Central United Front Work Department: Liu Yandong
Head of Central International Liaison Department: Wang Jiarui
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2. STATE SUPREME ORGANIZATIONS
President: Hu Jintao
Vice President: Zeng Qinghong
Chairman of Standing Committee of National People’s Congress: Wu
Bangguo
Chairman of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference: Jia
Qinglin
Premier of State Council: Wen Jiabao
Chairman of PRC Central Military Commission: Hu Jintao
President of Supreme People’s Committee: Xiao Yang
Procurator General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate: Jia Chunwang
3. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
Chief of General Staff Headquarters: Liang Guanglie
Director of General Political Department: Li Jinai
Director of General Logistics Department: Liao Xilong
Director of General Armament Department: Chen Bingde
Commander of PLA Navy: Zhang Dingfa
Commander of PLA Air Force: Qiao Qingchen
Commander of Second Artillery Corps: Jing Zhiyuan
4. STATE COUNCIL
Premier: Wen Jiabao
Vice Premiers: Huang Ju, Wu Yi, Zeng Peiyan, Hui Liangyu
State Councillors: Zhou Yongkang, Cao Gangchuan, Tang Jiaxuan, Hua
Jianmin,1 Chen Zhili
Foreign Affairs Minister: Li Zhaoxing
National Defense Minister: Cao Gangchuan
State Development and Reform Commission Minister: Ma Kai
Education Minister: Zhou Ji
Science and Technology Minister: Xu Guanhua
Minister of State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense: Zhang Yunchuan
State Ethnic Affairs Commission Minister: Li Dek Su
Public Security Minister: Zhou Yongkang
State Security Minister: Xu Yongyue
Supervision Minister: Li Zhilun
Civil Affairs Minister: Li Xueju
Justice Minister: Wu Aiying
Finance Minister: Jin Renqing
Personnel Minister: Zhang Bailin
Labor and Social Security Minister: Tian Chengping
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Land and Natural Resources Minister: Sun Wensheng
Construction Minister: Wang Guangtao
Railways Minister: Liu Zhijun
Communications Minister: Li Shenglin
Information Industry Minister: Wang Xudong
Water Resources Minister: Wang Shucheng
Agriculture Minister: Du Qinglin
Commerce Minister: Bo Xilai
Culture Minister: Sun Jiazheng
Health Minister: Gao Qiang
State Population and Family Planning Commission Minister: Zhang
Weiqing
Governor of People’s Bank of China: Zhou Xiaochuan
Auditor General of Auditing Administration: Li Jinhua
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission2
Chairman: Li Rongrong
1 Concurrently serves as President of State Administration College.
2 Special Organization under State Council.
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APPENDIX 6.3 LIST OF TOP OFFICIALS OF
PROVINCES, CITIES, AND AUTONOMOUS
REGIONS (as of end of 2005)
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Provinces, Cities,
Autonomous
Regions
Secretaries of
Provincial
Committees 
Governors,
Mayors, and
Chairman
Chairmen of Standing
Committees of Provincial
People’s Congresses
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Inner Mongolia 
Liaoning 
JIlin 
Heilongjiang 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Shandong 
Henan 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Hainan 
Chongqing 
Sichuan 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 
Liu Qi
Zhang Lichang 
Bai Keming 
Zhang Baoshun 
Chu Bo 
Li Keqiang 
Wang Yunkun 
Qian Yunlu
Chen Liangyu
Li Yuanchao 
Xi Jinping 
Guo Jinlong 
Lu Zhangong 
Meng Jianzhu 
Zhang Gaoli 
Xu Guangchun 
Yu Zhengsheng
Zhang Chunxian
Zhang Dejiang
Gao Bochun
Wang Xiaofeng
Wang Yang
Zhang Xuezhong 
Shi Zongyuan 
Bai Enpei 
Zhang Qingli (acting)
Li Jianguo 
Su Rong 
Zhao Leji 
Chen kuiyuan
Wang Lequan 
Wang Qishan 
Dai Xianglong 
Ji Yunshi 
Yu Youjun (acting)
Yang Jing
Zhang Wenyue
Wang Min
Zhang Zuoji 
Han Zheng 
Liang Baohua
Lu Zushan
Wang Jinshan
Huang Xiaojing 
Huang Zhiquan 
Han Yuqun 
Li Chenshu 
Luo Qingquan 
Zhou Bohua 
Huang Huahua 
Lu Bing 
Wei Liucheng 
Wang Hongju 
Zhang Zhongwei 
Shi Xiushi 
Xu Rongkai 
Qiangba Puncog 
Chen Deming 
Lu Hao 
Song Xiuyan 
Ma Qizhi
Ismail Tiliwaldi
Yu Junbo
Fang Fengyou
Bai Keming 
(vacant)
Chu Bo
Li Keqiang
Wang Yunkun
Song Fatang
Gong Xueping
Li Yuanchao 
Xi Jinping
Guo Jinlong 
Lu Zhangong
Meng Jianzhu 
Zhang Gaoli 
Xu Guangchun 
Yang Yongliang
Yang Zhengwu
Huang Liman
Cao Bochun
Wang Xiaofeng
Huang Zhendong
Zhang Xuezhong
Qian Yunlu
Bai Enpei
Legqog
Li Jianguo
Su Rong
Zhao Leji 
Chen kuiyuan
Abudurehim Amet 
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APPENDIX 6.4: MAJOR STATISTICS
1.General
Population (10 thousand persons)
Number of workers (10 thousand persons)
Increase in consumer price index (%)
Urban unemployment rates (%)
Exchange rates (US$1=yuan, average)
125,786
71,394
-1.4
3.1
8.2783
126,743
72,085
0.4
3.1
8.2784
127,627
73,025
0.7
3.6
8.277
128,453
73,740
-0.8
4
8.277
129,227
74,432
1.2
4.3
8.277
129,988
75,200
3.9
4.2
8.2768
130,756
...
1.8
4.2
8.1917
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 2005 and data from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China.       
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2. Gross Domestic Product by Type of Expenditure (at current prices)
Consumption expenditure
Private 
Government
Gross domestic capital formation
Exports of goods and services (net)
Gross domestic expenditure
54,601
42,896
11,705
32,500
2,240
89,341
58,927
45,898
13,029
37,461
2,205
98,593
62,799
48,882
13,917
42,305
2,794
107,898
67,494
52,679
14,764
51,383
2,686
121,311
75,438
...
...
62,875
4,079
142,394
...
...
...
...
...
...
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 2005. However, because this yearbook does not reflect 
data from the 2004 economic census, major corrections are expected. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(100 million yuan)
3. Gross Domestic Product by Industries (at current prices)
Primary industry 
Secondary industry
Tertiary industry 
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Gross national product (GNP)
Food* production (10 thousand ton)
GDP per person (yuan)
14,548
41,034
34,095
89,677
...
50,839
7,129
14,716
45,556
38,942
99,215
...
46,218
7,828
15,516
49,512
44,627
109,655
...
45,264
8,592
16,239
53,897
50,197
120,333
...
45,706
9,368
17,068
62,436
56,318
135,823
...
43,070
10,510
20,956
73,904
65,018
159,878
...
46,950
12,299
22,718
86,208
73,395
182,321
...
48,401
13,944
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 2005 and data from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. (The GDP is revised based on the 2004 economic census.) 
Note: * Grain, beans, and potatoes.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 (100 million yuan)
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4. Growth Rates in Gross Domestic Product by Industries 
Primary sector of industry
Secondary sector of industry
Tertiary sector of industry
Gross domestic product (GDP)
2.8
8.1
9.3
7.6
2.4
9.4
9.7
8.4
2.8
8.4
10.2
8.3
2.9
9.8
10.4
9.1
2.5
12.7
9.5
10
6.3
11.1
10
10.1
5.2
11.4
9.6
9.9
Sources: Same as Table 3.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(%)
5. Foreign Trade by Country and Area
EU
Germany
USA
Japan
Hong Kong
ASEAN
South Korea
Taiwan
Others
  Total
721.5
174.4
924.7
594.1
762.7
309.3
201.0
90.1
778.9
4,382.3
Sources: Figures up to 2004, China Statistical Yearbook, 2005; Figures for 2005 are from 
China Customs.
Exports
530.6
242.9
338.6
741.5
111.2
473.3
431.3
493.6
1,007.5
4,127.6
Imports
2003
1,071.6
237.6
1,249.4
735.1
1,008.7
429.0
278.1
135.4
1,025.8
5,933.3
Exports
701.2
303.7
446.6
943.3
118.0
629.8
622.3
647.6
1,503.5
5,612.3
Imports
2004
1,437.1
325.3
1,629.0
840.0
1,244.8
553.7
351.1
165.5
1,073.5
7,620.0
Exports
740.0
307.2
487.3
1,004.5
1,222.7
750.0
768.2
746.8
574.5
6,601.2
Imports
2005
 (US$ 100 million)
6. Budget of the Central Government
Revenue
Expenditure
Overall balance
Deficit financing
Domestic bonds
Foreign borrowing
11,444
13,188
-1,744
3,715
3,715
0
13,395
15,887
-2,491
4,180
4,157
23
16,386
18,903
-2,517
4,604
4,484
120
18,904
22,053
-3,150
5,679
5,679
0
21,715
24,650
-2,935
6,154
6,033
121
26,356
28,361
-2,005
6,879
6,726
145
31,628
33,708
-2,080
...
...
...
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 2005; Figures for 2005 are from the fiscal report 
presented at the National People’s Congress. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(100 million yuan)
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7. Balance of Payments
Trade balance of goods
Exports, fob
Imports, fob
Balance of invisible trade 
Income balance
Current transfers
Current account
Capital and financial account
Capital account
Financial account
Direct investment
Outflow
Inflow
Portfolio Investment
Asset
Debts
Other investment
Asset
Debts
Net errors and omissions
Reserve assets 
441.7
3,256.50
-2,814.80
-67.8
-149.5
129.8
354.2
322.9
-5
323.4
467.9
-25.2
493.1
-103.4
-120.9
17.5
-41.1
-30.8
-10.3
77.9
-755.1
446.5
4,382.70
-3,936.20
-85.7
-78.4
176.3
458.7
527.3
-0.5
527.7
472.3
-82.8
555.1
114.3
29.8
84.4
-58.8
-179.2
120.4
184.2
-1,170.2
589.8
5,933.90
-5,344.10
-97
-35.2
229
686.6
1,106.60
-0.7
1,107.30
531.3
-18.1
549.4
196.9
64.9
132
379.1
19.8
359.3
270.5
-2,063.6
542.3
3,424.50
-2,882.30
-39.3
48.7
120.9
672.6
383
21.5
361.4
224.8
-39
263.7
-9.7
-84.6
74.9
146.3
-180.9
327.2
-51.1
-1,004.5
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various editions. Figures for first half of 2005 from 
China’s National Foreign Currency Management Bureau.  
2002 2003 2004 1H-2005
(US$100 million)
